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Political repression is often associated by Americans
with foreign, totalitarian nations. The existence of a national,
secret political police force seems antithetical to the notion
of a "free and open" democracy. Specific methods of political
suppression are often simultaneously viewed by Americans with
horror and relief. Horror, in that environments exist that
could rountinely violate basic human rightsi relief, in the .
belief that such environments exist only in foreign countries.
To indicate that this latter belief is fallacious is to say that
«
the United States is less than the free and open democracy it
is purported to be.
The maintenance of domestic peace in this society is in
the hands of the military and of local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies. Constitutionally, on all levels, these
bodies are under the authority of civilian policy makers who
are supposedly answerable to the electorate. In practice,
though, these agencies aeem to operate in ways that are strik¬
ingly similar to methods in fascist/totalitarian nations. The
policies of both appear to be the upholding of the status quo
while the methods used to affect these policies seem meant to
counter the activities of political dissidents,
A primary cog in America's law enforcement machinery is
1
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Traditionally, the
Bureau has claimed that it is an apolitical federal agencyj a
neutral tool used by the Congress and the President to enforce
the lawI a passive instrument of law enforcement. But what is
the basis of these claims and what exactly do they mean?
The most useful guide in defining this claim of apoliti¬
calness was offered in 1924 by Attorney General Harlan Fiske
Stone. In what later became known as the Stone Standard within
the Department of Justice, the overall, guiding rationale for
Bureau investigatory power is offered. It says ",,, The Bureau
of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opin¬
ions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct
and then only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of
the United States."^ In 1976, this standard was reiterated by
the Congress during investigations into the intelligence opera¬
tions of the Bureau.
Based on the Stone Standard, apolitical will be defined
as unconcerned with the opinions and lawful conduct, political
or otherwise, of individuals or groups. The investigation of
this alleged characteristic of the FBI is the central concern
of this paper.
Precisely stated, the central question this study will
answer is* Did the FBI during its COINTELPRO-Black Extremists
program operate in an apolitical manner? In other words, did
^U.S, Senate, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations, Book III. 94th Congress, 2nd session,
1976, p. 23.
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the policies initiated and procedures instituted by the Bureau
in response to black political activity from 1968 to 1971 com^
stitute apolitical law enforcement?
The descriptive analysis used to answer this question
will be divided into two aspects. The first concern will be
the development and nature of the policy that established and
guided the domestic intelligence program known as COINTELPRO-
Black Extremists, Defining this policy and how it evolved is
essential in setting the historical context of the program.
An examination of key precedents in the develpoment of the
Bureau's domestic intelligence activities will provide insight
into the nature of FBI operations. A brief narration of the
growth of the Bureau's counterintelligence activities along
with scrutinizing the specific purposes and objectives stated
at the beginning of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists should provide
grounds for determining the existence of non-political law
enforcement by the FBI,
The second aspect of this analysis is concerned with how
the program operated to achieve its stated goals. The specific
means to meet outlined objectives are surveyed along with a
brief look at the individuals and organizations at whom these
tactics were aimed. Were the methods used designed to appre¬
hend lawbreakers and to collect court-acceptable evidence rele¬
vant to each case? General categorizations of tactics according
to type accompanied by specific examples of actual incidents
should provide further clarity as to the nature of COINTELPRO
activities.
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There are key terms used throughout this study will be
defined here. The first term is "dissident" and will be employed
interchangeably with the terms "subversive", "extremist?’,’ and
"radical". This mixed use is not because the terms are synony¬
mous in everyday usage. These terms were used by the FBI in
its attempt to identify subjects whose political philosophies
and activities disagreed with the dominant political perspective.
Because the term dissident is insufficient, a myriad of labels
was used by the Bureau to justify its investigations into
dissenting politics. Bureau officials, particularly J. Edgar
Hoover, believed this type of political activism to be dangerous
to the national security.
Another term needing definition is "counterintelligence".
This term will refer to the Bureau's attempt to disrupt, neutra¬
lize, harass, and discredit the political activities of indivi¬
duals and groups labeled as threatening the domestic peace.
Pragmatism guided the FBI in implementing these tactics. Legality
and propriety meant little. To put it succinctly, counterintel¬
ligence methods are synonymous with "by any means necessary".
Many journal articles and books have been used as authori¬
tative sources throughout this study. The works cited below are
only a small sampling of those sources. Their fundamental im-
prtance, however, to the framework of this paper must be pointed
out.
Among the journal articles found to be most helpful was
Michael R. Belknap's "The Mechanics of Repression* J, Edgar Hoover,
the Bureau of Investigation and the Radicals, 1917-1925” in
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Crime and Social Justice. Belknap's attempt to expose the
Bureau's operations against radicals during Hoover's early
leadership provides a factual backdrop for understanding FBI
operations today,
"Hoover's Legacy" by Prank J. Donner in The Nation picks
up where Belknap's article ends, Donner is concerned with the
establishment of domestic intelligence as an official activity
of the Bureau, However, both authors emphasize that Hoover
was personally the most influential element throughout the
Bureau's evolution. Their concern is not with the institution
of the FBI but rather with the institution of J, Edgar Hoover,
This study differs, in that, the emphasis does not lie with
Hoover's personality, Bonner's sketch of the longtime FBI '
Director does, however, provide useful material for further
understanding the agency's historical role in national security.
The usefulness of Bonner's article does not stop ther,
though. His examination of the Bureau's intelligence investi¬
gations integrates well with a primary objective of this study,
a descriptive analysis of counterintelligence in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, Bonner's focus on the FBI's position towards
the New Left differs, however, from this paper's focus on the
Bureau's actions towards black activists,
A third article, "The Government is Watchingi Is There
Anything the Police Don't Want to Know?" by Thomas Powers in
The Atlantic provides insight into the scope of the FBI's and
other agencies' intelligence activities. This article's sur¬
vey of the breadth and depth of Bureau investigations helped
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in limiting this study's initial concerns. A much more mana¬
geable topic resulted.
Of the books examined during the course of this study,
the most helpful was FBI-An Unoensored Look Behind the Walls
by Sanford J, Ungar. This work not only provides a useful and
detailed history of the FBI's evolution but also several re¬
vealing portraits of officials who were keys to this develop¬
ment. The history that is given and the officials that are
identified in this book helped in all phases of this study by
providing a broad, factual base from which to work.
One of the many things encountered while reviewing the
literature was that many of the works were colored by either
a very negative or very positive attitude held by the author
towards the FBI, Few could be labeled as impartial. Sanford's
FBI, although critical, is an example of a somewhat imbiased
approach. Don Whitehead's The FBI Storyi A Report to the People
is an example of a very positive attitude. His account is so
positive, in fact, that J, Edgar Hoover saw fit to write the
book's foreword.
The FBI Story is important to this study, in that it is
the first time that Hoover gives a detailed account of his con¬
fidential 1936 executive directive giving the Bureau the alleged
authority to conduct domestic intelligence, Whitehead does
not hesitate to provide a platfonn from which Hoover could
justify the FBI activities during the McCarthy eira.
Investigating the FBI, a book that was edited by Pat Wat¬
ters and Stephen Cillers, is, on the other hand, a very critical
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study of the agency's history and policies. The condemnations
this hook offers are most useful because certain facts come to
light that would have remained hidden. For instance, chapter
three's analysis of the Bureau's budget concludes that because
of the lack of normal controls the budget is a source of much
of the agency's abuse of power. Overall, the book concentrates
on Hoover's last years with the Bureau, It also offers extent
sive documentation for areas useful to this study.
Among the federal government documents that were essential
to the documentation in this study were the reports of the House
of Representatives' Committee on the Judiciary's subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights. The two reports that were
found to be most helpful were the FBI Counterintelligence Pro¬
grams and FBI Oversight. The former contains the "Petersen
Report", an intradepartmental look at COINTELPRO. The latter
report contains a cost/benefit analysis of FBI domestic intel¬
ligence by the General Accounting Office,
The Senate Select Intelligpece^ Committee chaired by Frank
Church (D-Idaho) also provides valuable reports. Particularly,
Books II, III, and IV of the committee's final report reveals
the attitudes held by most of the Congress towards remedies for
problems detected by their investigations. This body's findings
and recommendations are briefly reviewed later in this paper.
The collection of data for this study will in's^ov^ both
primary and secondary materials. Secondary sources will be re¬
lied upon for the construction of the historical context of the
Bureau's domestic intelligence activities. Books and articles.
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written by political scientists and historians, regarding the
evolution of the FBI and its domestic intelligence policy will
also be employed.
The accuracy of these secondary sources will be checked
by comparing the accounts of several writers. No facts will be
presented in this paper unless corroborated. Also, by comparing
various historical works, a representative extraction of facts
is more likely.
The primary sources expected to be examined are memorandas,
letters, and progress reports exchanged between the FBI field
offices and FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. during the
counterintelligence efforts involving black activists. Several
thousand pages of documents have been released under the Freedom
of Information Act and are available in the J. Edgar Hoover
FBI Building in Washington, D.C. A small sample of these docu¬
ments were xeroxed and placed in the Appendix of this paper.
Other governmental documents to be used include materials
submitted to various executive and legislative bodies as they
attempted to assess the nature and activities of COINTELPRO,
The materials include staff reportsi testimonies of various
officials involved with the programj descriptive analysis of
the programs activities! judgments regarding the propriety of
the Bureau's policy and actions! and recommendations regarding
any future counterintelligence activities.
It is not believed that the government has made all materi¬
als relevant to COINTELPRO public. However, enough material
has been released as to allow an accurate portrayal of the FBI's
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activities during the era of COINTELPRO,
The. jnethodology utilized in this study involves an ex¬
haustive descriptive analysis involving techniques of document
analysis, historical research, and illustrative examples.
The systematic search for materials will include the
Reader*s Guide to Periodical Literature, the card catalogs of
libraries, and abstracts indexing Congressional proceedings
investigating the FBI. The bibliographies of books and articles
dealing with the Bureau should also prove to be most helpful in
locating relevant materials.
Once materials have been located and following a gleaning
of pertinent facts, classifications will be made according to
information contributing to: (l) the program's historical con¬
text: (2) COINTELPRO's policy characteristics: and (3) descrip¬
tions of the tactics used during the program.
Following this classification process, this study will
assess the character of the program's historical beginnings and
operations. The Stone Standard is the basis of this assessment.
Whether it can be said that the FBI's counterintelligence pro¬
gram against black activists operated in an apolitical manner
will depend on the extent to which the information gathered
supports the Bureau's position of being unconcerned with the
lawful opinions and conduct of black activists whose energies
were directed at the government.
The paper's format will follow this outline:
Chapter I, Introduction
Chapter II. The Basis of COINTELPRO
Chapter III, The Policy and Mechanics of COINTELPRO
Chapter IV, Concluding Assessments of COINTELPRO
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The conclusion of this study is expected to offer an
accurate portrayal of FBI operations during COINTELPRO-Black Ex¬
tremists, It is hoped that this paper will act as a preliminary
study to future inquiries into the role federal law enforce¬
ment plays in the black community.
CHAPTER II
THE BASIS OF COINTELPRO
The Bureau of Investigation, the immediate forerunner of
the modern Federal Bureau of Investigation, was established in
1908 as a permanent detective force that would enable the
Department of Justice to effectively investigate land frauds
and antitrust violations. The Bureau's main proponent, Charles
Bonaparte, Attorney General of the United States under Presi¬
dent Theodore Roosevelt, argued that "a Department of Justice
with no force of permanent police in any form under its control
1
is assuredly not fully equipped for its work,” Congress res'^
ponded by authorizing funds to be used for investigations
regarding official matters under the control of the Justice
Department,
Significant expansions of the Bureau came quickly. In
1910, the agency was authorized to enforce the White Slave
Traffic Act, also known as the Mann Act, which prohibited inter-
p
state transportation of women for the purpose of prostitution.
Because of the wide application of the law and the broad inter¬
pretation given it by the Supreme Court, the Mann Act had a
' 1
Sanford J, Ungar, FBI-An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls
(BostonI Little, Brown, & Co,, 1976), p, 39,
2
U,S, Congress, Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI
vol, VI, hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 9^th, Congress,
1st session, p, 5^8,
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significant, longrange impact on the Bureau in that its man-
3
power was dramatically increased.
Another noteworthy development in the early evolution of
the Bureau came during the World War I years. During this time
the agency began to function as a political police force. The
statutory authorization for this role was granted by the Espi¬
onage and Sedition Acts which criminalized a wide range of ut¬
terances and publications critical of the government and its
policies. The Trading with the Enemy Act and the Selective
Service and Training Act also worked to expand the agency's
political police power. The Bureau's interests were no longer
limited to traditional areas of criminal investigation but,
with the passage of these acts, were broadened to cover matters
concerning internal security and national d^l<^nse,^
At this time the Bureau had about 400 agents but these
were not capable of adequately handling the duties assigned.
Justice Department officials turned to "a volunteer organiza¬
tion of loyal citizens", the American Protective League, to
assist the overloaded Bureau.^ As a result of this union,
during three days of massive raids in New York and Newark,
50,000 men were arrested simply because they did not have a draft
card in their possession. The Bureau's intent was to apprehend
^Ungar, FBI. pp. 40-4l,
^Michael R. Belknap, "The Mechaincs of Repression! J. Ed¬
gar Hoover, The Bureau of Investigation and the Radicals, 1917-
1925t” Crime and Social Justice. No. 7 (Spring/Summer 1977)♦
p. 49.
^Ungar, FBI. p. 42.
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men who had failed to register for the draft. However, only-
one in every two hundred turned out to be a genuine draft-dod¬
ger.^ As a result, the experiment with civilian vigilantes
ended but the control of unpatriotic elements remained as one
of the Bureau's guiding principles.
This principle was most infamously illustrated by the
'Red Raids which later became known as the 'Palmer Raids' in
honor of Attorney General A, Mitchell Palmer, In response to
bombings and bomb scares, the Bureau of Investigation in co¬
operation with the Immigration Service staged simultaneous
raids in eleven cities on meetings of various union and poli¬
tical organizations who were considered dangerous and anar¬
chistic in light of the Red-Radical Scare of 1917-1921. The
Federation of the Union of Russian Workers, the Socialist
Party, the Industrial Workers of the World, and the Communist
Party were primary targets of the raids. The arrests, harass¬
ment, and legal proceedings which followed the raids shattered
the American Communist movement but the Bureau continued to
insist during Congressional appropriation hearings that radi¬
calism was growing stronger every day and that unless the country
became aroused th^situation would become very serious.7 Even
though Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in 1921 revealed dis¬
crepancies in the search warrants, illegal arrests, and perjury
on the part of Palmer in giving testimony to previous Congres-
^U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI. p,5^9.
^Belknap, “Mechanics of Repression," p. 51
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sional investigations of the raids, Congress responded hot by
condemning the illegalities Attorney General Palmer authorized
but by sanctioning the raids as necessary measures taken
against alien anarchists. Only three Senators dissented re¬
sulting in opposing committee reports being printed in the
Congressional Record.^
The Palmer Raids are noteworthy in this study not only
because they helped set a precedent for the Bureau's role as
a governmental political force but they also introduced a young
law school graduate as head of the General Intelligence Divi¬
sion of the Bureau, During the Senate investigations of the '
raids, John(Edag:^Hoover appeared along with Palmer to defend
the agency's actions. Hoover eventually became the primary
catalyst by which the Department of Justice repressed dissident
political views.
Soon after the Senate investigations, the new President,
Warren Harding replaced Attorney General Palmer with Harry
Daugherty who* in turn, appointed William J, Burns as the
Director of the Bureau of Investigation, With Burns at the
helm, the Bureau's budget rose by $250,000j Hoover was made As¬
sistant Director! and the investigation and repression of
9
domestic radicalism increased. Under Burns the Bureau be¬
came involved on the state level with the investigation and
®Vem-Countryfliani "The History of the FBI» Democracy's _ -
Development of a Secret Police," in Pat Watters and Stephen Gil
lers (eds.). Investigating the FBI (New York: Doubleday & Co,,
Inc,, 1973). P. 48,
Belknap, "Mechanics of Repression," p, 51.
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prosecution of the noncriminal, political activities of soci¬
alists and communists. Assisted by increased use of informants
planted deep within radical organizations, the Bureau again
conducted raids aimed at further destroying the movements.
Despite the lack of jurisdiction on the state level, Bureau
agents made arrests and pressed for the conviction of dissidents
around the nation.
Upon the death of Harding, President Calvin Coolidge ap¬
pointed a civil libertarian as the new Attorney General, Harlan
Fiske Stone, Stone's philosophy clashed with that of his pre¬
decessors and in his attempt to revamp the Bureau, he accepted
the resignation of Director Burns and in December 1924, made
Hoover, then twenty-nine years old. Directonofjthe Bureau, In
order to secure this position. Hoover enthusiastically abandoned
the policies he had helped implement while Palmer and Burns
headed the Bureau, The new Director embarked on a ten year
drive to rid the Bureau of incompetents, to increase admini¬
strative efficiency and to concentrate exclusively on the en¬
forcement of various federal laws on interstate crime.
Prior to Hoover's rebuilding, the Bureau's recruitment
of agents was not geared at selecting the best qualified. The
party affiliations and political connections of individuals
along with specific recommendations from various congressmen
had been the primary means of selecting agents for the Bureau,
These practices in addition to the low rate of prosecution had
l^Ungar, FBI, p, 46
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recipient of positive public notice and expanded responsibilities.
By 1935* the Bureau of Investigation, renamed the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), had become a most important cog in
federal laW enforcement.
This importance was exemplified on August 24, 1936, when
Hoover was called to the White House for a conference with Presi¬
dent Franklin Roosevelt, This was the first of three conferen¬
ces that led to federal investigation "of the subversive acti¬
vities in the Unites Stafes, particularly Fascism and Communism.
It was decided at the meetings that the FBI would coor¬
dinate intelligence investigations with the War Department's
Military Intelligence Division, the Office of Naval Intelligence,
and the State Department. The investigations were to be for in¬
telligence purposes only, and not the t3rpe of investigations
l4
required in collecting evidence for court presentation. This
was the first time since the Red Hunts of the 1920s that the
Bureau participated in the search for subversives, i,e, Nazis
and Communists, Federal lawbreaking was again joined by dis¬
sident ideology and behavior as primary concerns of the FBI.
On September 5» 1936, a memorandum went to all FBI field
offices. In part it said.
The Bureau desires to obtain from all possible sources in¬
formation concerning subversive, activities being conducted
^^Ibid,, p, 560, These meetings were to remain secret un¬
til. 1956 when Hoover released, through a personal interview, the
memoranda he wrote immediately after the conferences supplemented
by his recollection of the conversations that took place.
^^Don Whitehead, The FBI Storv» A Report to the People (New
Yorkj Random House, 1956), pp, 157“159.
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had created an agency that was one of the most discredited in
Washington, D.C.
During this reconstruction period, Attorney General Stone
affirmed the apolitical stance of the Bureau. He stated that
the Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with politi¬
cal or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only
with their conduct and then only with such conduct as is
forbidden by the laws of the United States, When a police
system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the
proper administration of justice and to human liberty,
which it should be our first concern to cherish,H
The investigation of radic^ activities was subsequently
limited during the late 1920s and early 1930s, Such investiga¬
tions were conducted only for specific purposes when requested
by the Attorney General and Secretary of State under the pro-
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visions of the Appropriations Act, 28 USC 533 (3). It is
held by most authors that from 1924 to 1934, the Bureau con¬
ducted general domestic radical investigations where the acti¬
vity indicated that there had been a violation of the federal
laws and where investigations were requested by the State Depart¬
ment through the Attorney General,
During this time of low profile for the Bureau, Hoover
supervised two important developments. First, the passage of
six special crime bills which transformed offenses only punish-
able on the state level into federal crimes. Tl^se^ bills paved
the way for federal investigations of organized crime while
also allowing for a significant increase in the Bureau's facili¬
ties and manpower. Secondly, the Bureau under Hoover became the
^^Ibid,, p, 49
12
U.S, Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p. 554.
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in the United States by Conanunists., Fascists, and repre¬
sentatives or advocates of other organizations or groups
advocating the overthrow or replacement of the Government
of the Unites States by illegal methods. No investigation
should be initiated into cases of this kind in the absence
of specific authorization from the Bureau, but you should
forward to the Bureau information obtained from all sources^
As a result of this new responsibility, the number of es¬
pionage cases investigated by the FBI increased from an average
i6
of 35 per year from 1933 to 1937, to 250 cases in 1938 alone.
These confidential investigations covered the following general
areas I the maritime industry» government affairsj the steel in¬
dustry; the coal industry; the newspaper field; the clothing,
garment, and fur industry; general strike activities of Com¬
munist and affiliated organizations; Fascist and anti-fascist
17
movements; and the activities of organized labor organizations.
The importance of the 1936 directive to present claims of
the FBI for its authority to initiate policy and conduct domes¬
tic intelligence is vital. The FBI holds that statements attri¬
buted to President Roosevelt in 1936 authorized and directed it
to conduct domestic intelligence investigations of subversives
and their activities. However, two important questions arise
regarding this alleged directive. First, are the August 24 and
25» 1936 memorandums from Hoover reliable? The documents serve
as the lone basis upon which later powers are claimed. Second,
if these memorand\ims are reliable what are the exact parameters
^ -^U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p. 562,
^^Whitehead, The FBI Story, p. l62,
17
U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p, 563.
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of the Bureau's jurisdiction?
Hoover's credibility has proven to be less than 100^
reliable when he perceived threats to the national security.
For instance, during Congressional hearings after his death
critics pointed out that he deceived Attorneys General, Presi¬
dents and the public when he felt it necessary. The surfacing
of these memorandxiins in 1956 could have been such a time. In
addition to this, there has been confusion over what was exactly
to be investigated. The only activities specifically mentioned
were those involving Fascism and Communism. Because of the
limited area open to the FBI in the investigation of subversives
by the Roosevelt directive, no legal basis can be found here
for the expanded coverage of intelligence operations during the
COINTELPRO era. Despite this weakness, the FBI claims the 1936
directive as the modem basis for its authority to conduct such
operations. Subsequent executive directives regarding the FBI's
authority to conduct do]i^tiC| intelligence are based upon the al¬
leged precedent set by Roosevelt.
On June 26, 1939. another confidential directive was is¬
sued by the President, It stated that "the Investigation of
all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters be con-
18
trolled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,.."
The heads of the Intelligence Division of the War Depart-
^®U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, FBI Oversight,
hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, aerial No, 2,
part 2, 9^th Congress, 1st session, p, 165, These hearings
further doctimented the FBI's need for a charter that explicitly
states congressionally approved areas for its authority. As to
this date, however, no such charter has been approved.
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ment and the Navy along with the Director of the FBI were to
form an Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee.
The President also ordered that no other agencies were to inves¬
tigate any "of these specified matters and that all other govern-
mentragencies should report subversive activities to the nearest
office of the FBI".^^
This directive was made public on September 6, 1939. The
statement issued by the President repeated what had been confi¬
dentially ordered in June. But it also requested that all "law
enforcement officers in the Unites States promptly...turn over
to the nearest representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investi¬
gation any information obtained by them relating to espionage,
counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and violations
of the neutrality laws."^®
The June and September directives served to coordinate
activities and affix responsibilities upon the FBI for more ef-
21
fective intelligence operations. Up to this time there had
been no central coordinating body that could be held responsible
for this type of work. Yet, the question raised earlier remains.
What were the boundaries of the Bureau’s authority?
Three subsequent Presidential directives regarding the
FBI and the control of subversive activities merely reaffirm the
principles established in 1939. They do not work to clarify the
^^Ibid.
20
U.S. President, The Public Papers and Addresses of Frank¬
lin D. Roosevelt Vol. 8 (New Yorki The MacMillan Co., 19^l). p.
478, 479.
^^U.S. House, FBI Oversight, pp. I65-167.
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situation because they do not define specifically clouded areas
of the Roosevelt directives. President Harry Truman's directive
of July 24, 1950 reiterates the same points made by Roosevelt.
President Dwight Eisenhower's December 15* 1953 directive pointed
back to its predecessors and differed only by referring to a
legislative act as a basis for the assigned responsibilities.
Violations of the Atomi^ Energy Act were specified as crimes
deserving the intelligence practices of the FBI. Nowhere in
any of the directives is explicit authority delegated to the
FBI in conducting intelligence investigations of domestic pbli-
22
tical dissidents.
Can such authority be found in legislative enactments?
According to documents submitted before the House of Representa¬
tives' investigative committee on FBI oversight and to memo-
randas circulated within the Department of Justice, such authority
is , at best, ambiguously stated and, at worst, interpreted in
ways that violate the constitutional and civil rights of indivi¬
duals and groups targeted for intelligence investigations.^^
The statutes commonly cited by the FBI as granting it
authority to conduct domestic intelligence activities are to be
found in Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code (USC).
Title 18 provides a list of crimes that fell within the Bureau's
alleged jurisdiction. For example, rebellion or insurrection
^^See U.S. Presidents, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States (Washington, D.C.i Office of the Federal Regis¬
ter, National Archives and Records Service, 1950, 1963)* Harry
S Truman, 1950, p. 5^5 and Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* P« 830.
23u.S. Senate.FTfitelligence Activities of the FBI, pp. 541-
544 and House, FBI Oversight, pp. 167-170.
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is prohibited by section 2383? seditious conspiracy by section
23841 while section 2385 outlaws the advocation of the over¬
throw of the government.
Title 28, section 533 authoritfs the Attorney General to
appoint officials that will "detect and prosecute" crimes against
the United States, The FBI asserts that its agents are the
24
aforementioned officials.
The problem with this "statutory authority" is that the
scope, functions, and objectives of the Bureau's domestic counter¬
intelligence program are not outlined. In 28 USC 533» For
example, a precise definition of a key phrase, "detect and pro¬
secute", is lacking. Does it mean longterm surveillance of
individuals and groups in order to discover if crimes have been
committed that could lead to prosecution? Or do the statutes
authorize the harassment and disruption of domestic dissidents
deemed dangerous by the FBI?
The unclear legislative intent allows questionable inter¬
pretive processes to be used by Bureau officials in determining
the nature of their intelligence operations. Policies formed
by that process have traditionally followed a stance believed
to be pragmatic by FBI officials. These pragmatic policies are
seldom subject to review by anyone outside of the Bureau,
The lack of a definitive executive or legislative mandate
determining the intelligence jurisdiction of the Bureau along
with critical shifts in the political atmosphere provided fer-
^^U.S, House, FBI Oversight, pp. I67-171.
^^Ibid., pp, 167-168.
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tile ground for the development of what became officially known
as COINTELPRO. This is a generic term used to describe what
developed into seven separate counterintelligence programs.
The FBI implemented these programs at different times during
the years of 1956 to 1971* when all were supposedly discontinued,^^
The development of these programs integrated well with the
Bureau’s policies and activities regarding the domestic secu¬
rity responsibilities assumed after the 1936 executive directive.
Included in its efforts to take charge of its 'mandate', the
FBI began compiling information about individuals whose liberty
"in time of war or national emergency would be dangerous to the
public peace and the safety of the United States Govememnt,
This "suspect list” was composed of individuals who exhibited
Nazi or Communist tendencies. These and other "potentially
dslngerous" individuals were to be held in "custodial detention"
28
pending investigation in the event of a national emergency.
In 19^3* after four years of compiling and classifying
names according to "individual danger classifications", a new
Attorney General, Francis Biddle, ordered the end of the Custo-
29
dial Detention List, Biddle felt that the classifications
26
Most sources agree that questionable tactics used during
this period continued informally after the programs were suppos¬
edly ended in 1971, These sources include the New York Times,
the Washington Post, and several investigatory committees of
Congress,
^^U,S, Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p, 409.
28
U.S. House, FBI Oversight, p, I89. See also Carolina
Rose and Ken Lawrence, J, Edgar Hoover's Detention Plan» The
Politics of Repression in the U.S,, 1939-197^ ^Jackson. Mis-
sippippi: American Friends Service Committee, 1978),
^^U,S. Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI. pp,4l2-413*
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served no useful purpose and that the practice had "no statutory
authority or other present justification," He also stated that
the classification system was "inherently unreliable" because
The evidence used for the purpose of making classifications
was inadequatej the standards applied to the evidence for
the purpose of making the classifications were defective>
and finally, the notion that it is possible to make a
valid determination as to how dangerous a person is in the
abstract, and without reference to time, environment, and
other relevant circumstances, is impractical, unwise, and
dangerous,
FBI Director Hoover, however, effectively avoided his
superior's direct order. The listing and use of the list was
not discontinued by the Bureau, Instead, it was renamed the
Security Index and no evidence exists that shows that the FBI
advised the Attorney General it maintained the index,^ In
fact. Hoover directed the Special Agents-in-Charge (SACs) of
FBI field offices in a strictly confidential letter to merely
no longer use the phrase "custodial detention" and to replace
its reference with the term "Security Index", He further di¬
rected the field office heads to keep the existence of the Se¬
curity Index "strictly confidential", FBI officials were at
"no time to mention or allude to in investigative reports or
discuss with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau" the
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maintenance of this material.
^°Ibid,, p, 412,
3^U,S. House, FBI Oversight, p, 189,
^^U,S, Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, pp, 4l4-
4i5. Hoover's circumvention of his superior's policies is not
only illustrative of his methods of administering the Bureau
but also serves as further basis for understanding the nature
of COINTELPRO,
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By 1949* the Department of Justice reversed its official
position regarding custodial detention thereby again providing
sanction of the Security Index,By the mid-1950s, the Cold
War and McCarthyism had stretched the measures to preserve the
status quo to extraordinary dimensions. These measures in¬
cluded the initiation of COINTELPRO by the FBI. This program
was hindsightedly justified by a former Bureau Official, He
said, "Hence, just as a soldier on a field of battle did not
consider it wrong to kill the enemy, so too, on the home front
it was not considered wrong in major cases to use extraordinary
measures in security work...both had the same goal vanquish
the enemy.
During the 1950s, the "enemy was the Communist Party of
the United States of America (CPUSA). During the 1960s, the
list of enemies increased dran^-^ally. The tactics used against
these enemies followed the model established by the COINTELPRO-
CPUSA, The enemies generally fell into the following categories
around which counterintelligence programs were officially con¬
ducted: in 1956, the forerunner of all other COINTELPROs began
against the Communist Partyi the Socialist Workers Party became
do not indicate why the reversal occurred. How¬
ever, I speculate that the exit of Attorney General Biddle, the
influence of Hoover's own politics and the shift from the World
War against Fascism to the Cold War against Communism had much
to do with it,
^^William C, Sullivan, former Assistant Director of the FBI,
"personal Observations and Recommendations on Privacy", U.S.House
of Representatives, Surveillance. hearings before the Subcommit¬
tee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice,
94th Congress, 1st session, 1975t P» 724,
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a COINTELPRO subject officially in 196lj in 1964, "White Hate
Groups" became an enemyj "Black Extremists" qualified in 1967j
and operations against the "New Left" were officially inaugurated
in 1968. Two other COINTELPROs were in the area of foreign es¬
pionage within the United States,
The primary interest of this study's remaining text will
be the FBI's activities and policies composing the COINTELPRO-
Black Extremists, The term "Black Extremists" was a term broad¬
ly used to include those involved with the civil rights move¬
ment, urban riots, and other factors seen as threatening to
the domestic peace.
Counterintelligence activities against black activists
began to take official form in the summer of 1967, In response
to concerns that the urban riots were attributable to a con¬
spiracy to cause general disorder. Hoover ordered the creation
of the Rabble-Rouser Index, Its purpose was to follow the ac¬
tivities of individuals who had demonstrated by their actions
and speeches "a propensity for fomenting disorders of a racial
and/or security nature," The index was also "to provides (l) a
ready reference in the field and at the Bureau to specified
personal data and (2) a short siammary of activities of indexed
subjects indicating a propensity for violence,As can be
readily seen, the maintenance of the Security Index provided
the basis for this index.
Originally, the Rabble-Rouser Index included only indi¬
viduals recognized nationally. But by November 1967, it was
^%.S, House, FBI Oversight, p. 192.
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felt by the Bureau officials that "the national security pro¬
blems created by local activists had grovm sufficiently to
warrant including them in the index." In March 1968, 250 per¬
sons were listed on the index. During 1969t the total increased
to 700 names. By October 1970, 1,131 persons appeared on what
had been renamed the Agitator Index.
A second category of programs that proceeded and supple¬
mented counterintelligence operations against persons involved
in the black political movement were known as the Key Activist
and Key Extremist programs. There were primarily two features
that distinguished these programs from the Agitator Index,
First, the Agitator Index provided only basic vital information
on a subject while the latter programs involved exhaustive in¬
vestigatory means which yielded information on the day-to-day
activities of subjects and their future plans for staging demon¬
strations and other anti-government activities.
Secondly, the Key Activist and Key Extremist programs were
concerned with only the most active of the agitators. For ex¬
ample, the Key Activist program had, at its peak, 76 individuals
under investigation while the Key Extremist program had 90 per¬
sons when it was at its peak,^^ Even though both were used to
supplement the counterintelligence tactics used against subjects,
neither program was discontinued when COINTELPRO was officially
terminated in 1971. These programs, characterized by their in-
^^Ibid., pp. 191-192.
37i'bid., p, 193. The difference between the Key Activist
program and the Key Extremist program was only the subjects being
investigated. Both used the same methods of investigation and
both had the same objectives.
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tensive investigative practices, were not ended until February
1975.
Both the Agitator Index and the Key Activist and Key Ex¬
tremist programs supplemented the domestic security efforts of
the FBI by pinpointing individuals and groups as targets for
counterintelligence activities. Originally, these efforts to
disrupt, expose, and neutralize targeted subjects were limited,
in the Roosevelt era, to agents of foreign governments and their
sympathizers,^® The targeting of domestic groups for these
counterintelligence efforts is the distinguishing characteristic
of COINTELPRO, How this was done and what policies guided this
program will be examined in the next section of this study.
^®U,S. Congress, House of Representatives, FBI Counterin¬
telligence Programs, testimony of William B, Saxbe before the
Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee on the
Judiciary, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, p, 11,
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CHAPTER III
THE POLICY AND MECHANICS OF COINTELPRO
In portrating the nature of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists
it is essential that the official policies that guided the pro¬
gram be examined. The purpose of this section is to do that
along with characterizing the specific means by which these
policies were carried out. The specific means to be described
include the FBI's administrative apparatus, its lines of re¬
sponsibility, and the type of tactics employed against the pro¬
gram's targets.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's structural composi¬
tion consists of thirteen operating divisions. The divisions
range from the well known Identification Division which main¬
tains millions of fingerprints to the Intelligence Division
which is responsible for national security investigations in
foreign and domestic intelligence matters. This latter divi¬
sion was responsible for directing and coordinating, with direct
approval of the Director, the operations known within the Bureau
as COINTELPRO.
The Intelligence Division is composed of two branches.
The Counterintelligence Branch is concerned with the activities
of unfriendly foreign governments within the United States, The
Internal Security Branch is responsible for the supervision and
coordination of investigatory matters involving black, white,
29
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Hispanic, and Native American "extremists". This branch's
jurisdiction specifically covers sedition, sabotage, civil
unrest and acts of violence, and the activities of revolutionary
groups and organizations. It was this branch that administered
COINTELPRO.l
The responsibilities of the Internal Security Branch of
the Intelligence Division were distributed among three sections
labeled the Extremist Section, the Subversive Section, and the
Research Section, The Extremist Section is responsible for
policy formulation as it provides guidance to field offices in
the investigatory area of extremists. This section is also ac¬
countable for handling racial matters involving riots, demon¬
strations and other acts of civil disobedience. The Extremist
Section also determines whether there are Communist influences
among targeted groups and individuals. The development of ex¬
tremist informants is fundamental to the successful operations
2
of this section, particularly in regards to COINTELPRO,
The Subversive Section of the Internal Security Branch
has six primary functions: (l) supervising investigations re¬
lating to the activities of revolutionary Communist organiza¬
tions and individuals* (2) investigating revolutionary fugitives
who have been allegedly involved with terrorist activities*
(3) developing and utilizing subversive informants* (4) formu¬
lating policy to be followed by the field offices on subversive
matters* (5) initiating and reviewing the results of subversive
^Ungar, FBI, the front and back inside cover pages.
^U.S. House, FBI Oversight, p. l63.
31
programs and investigations and providing relevant information
to government officials and agencies} (6) maintaining the FBI's
Administrative Index, which is identical to the Security Index
described in Chapter II, This index consists of the identifica¬
tion and location of radical individuals considered by the
Bureau as being "extremely dangerous",^
The third portion of the Internal Security Branch is the
Research Section, It serves the entire Intelligence Division
by preparing research papers and analysis on broad intelligence
areas. The responsibilities of this section also include pre¬
paring requests for authorizing electronic surveillance. The
importance of this section cannot be played down because among
its other duties are* (l) serving as instructors and setting
up schools for agents before they are assigned to counterintel¬
ligence work} and (2) advising the FBI on how Congressional bills
and legislation will affect the Intelligence Division,^
The Internal Security Branch, though, is just a portion
of the multilevel nature of the Bureau's COINTELPRO operations.
The policy of headquarters coordination of investigations initi¬
ated by the field offices illustrates the effort of FBI officials
to rigidly keep lines of authority clearly marked. No policy
could be made and actualized without the approval of at least
the Assistant Director. COINTELPRO was not a freak phenomenon




COINTELPRO was planned and promoted at the highest level within
the Bureau while being carried out through the Intelligence
Division by all fifty-nine field offices.
In fact, upon instituting the COINTELPRO aimed at "Black
Nationalist-Hate Groups”, the Director of the FBI ordered, "No
counterintelligence action under this program may be initiated
by the Field without specific prior Bureau authorization." Un¬
derlines in the original ^
In a February 29, 1968 memorandum designed to expand the
counterintelligence program to include forty-one field offices.
Assistant Director William C. Sullivan approved further streng¬
thening of the lines of responsibility. Accountability for
counterintelligence activities directed against Black Nationalist
Hate Groups had two major aspects. First, as in the Ahgust 25,
1967 letter, all actions taken against targeted individuals
and groups must be approved by the Bureau. Second, progress
letters summarizing counterintelligence operations must be sub¬
mitted every ninety days to the Bureau headquarters,^
The ninety-day progress letter became characteristic of
how the COINTELPRO activities were administered. These letters
contained information that fell under the following captions:
(1) Operations Under Consideration; (2) Operations Being Effected
(3) Tangible Results; and (4) Development of Counterintelligence
^See Appendix, Memorandum to William C, Sullivan, Assistant
Director of the FBI in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Divi¬
sion from George C, Moore, Intelligence'Division Supervisor of
Black Nationalist Affairs, on February 29, 1968,
^Ibid.
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Interest.^ In these reports, the SACs were expected to evalu¬
ate the effectiveness of approved investigations, as well as
acknowledge their comJ)lianee with headquarters instructions
regarding the parameters of their activities.
Bureau approval for proposed COINTELPRO activities re¬
sulted only after inspection and evaluation on many levels.
For example, after a report or a request for approval of a
certain activity was received from a field office it may have
gone through as many as six levels of superiors before it was
finally approved. In certain sensitive operations, approval
8
came from as high as the Director’s desk.
Instructions sent to the field offices upon their initi¬
ation of counterintelligence activities were illustrative of the
tight control Bureau headquarters required. Every move made by
the field offices were to be reported to the Bureau, The pre¬
liminary steps towards the formation of COINTELPROs in the vari¬
ous field offices were to follow orders given by Sullivan’s
Intelligence Division, Those steps directed the SAC to submit
to Bureau headquarters "a very succinct summary of the Black
nationalist movement in the field office territory”. To be in¬
cluded in this "succinct stunmary" were the names, number of
members, and degree of activity of each black nationalist group;
an estimation "of each group’s propensity for violence"; ahd a
list of Rabble-Rouser Index subjects who could be targets for
Q
current or future counterintelligence action.^
7lbid.
®U.S. House, FBI Oversight, pp, 175“177.
^February 29, 1968 Memo from W.C, Sullivan from G.C. Moore.
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The overall goals of COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist-Hate
Groups^® acted as the guidelines for all operations. These
goals were first briefly outlined in the August 25, 196? letter
and later reiterated in the February 29» 1968 memorandum. In
general, the objectives of the program were to use the FBI’s
resources to disrupt the groups and to counter perceived threats
to the national security,
The five long-range goals set for COINTELPRO-Black Extre¬
mists were designed to provide maximum effectiveness in exchange
for a minimal amount of effort. Specifically, the first goal
was to "prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist
groups.” The Bureau felt that "an effective coalition of black
nationalist groups might be the first step towards a real 'Mau
12
Mau’ in America, the beginning of a true black revolution','
The second goal was to "prevent the rise of a messiah who
could unify, and electrify the militant black nationalist move¬
ment,” Four individuals were considered to be enough of a threat
for this position that officials felt it necessary that they be
immediately targeted for neutralization. These targets were
the memory of Malcolm X, who was considered by the Bureau as the
movement’s martyr> Elijah Muhammed, whose age somewhat less^c^ed
his potentialI Martin Luther King, Jr., the individual seen by
the FBI as "a very real contender for this position should he
^^This title was used interchangeably with COINTELPRO-Black
Extremists.
l^U.S. House, FBI Oversight, pp. 175-177.
^^February 29» 1968 memo to W,C. Sullivan from G.C. Moore,
particularly p. 3.
abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white liberal doctrines'
(nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism"} and Stokely Car¬
michael, whose personal charisma qualified him as a "real threat"
The third aim of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists was to "pre¬
vent violence on the part of black nationalist groups." FBI
officials directed that counterintelligence activities should
"pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before
they exercise their potential for violence.
The next objective of the program was to "prevent militant
black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability
by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community.
This goal was tactically directed at » (l) "the responsible Neg¬
ro community"} (2) the responsible white community and at white
"'liberals' who have vestiges of sympathy for the militant
black nationalists simply because they are Negroes"} and (3) Neg¬
ro radicals, the followers of the movement.
The fifth and final goal stated by Bureau policymakers was
aimed at preventing the long-range growth of militant black na¬
tionalist organization, especially among youth. Field offices
were directed to develop specific tactics to prevent groups
from converting young people.




^^Ibid., note p. 4,
was justified in February 29» 1968 memorandum. The deployment
of intelligence activities against domestic groups was believed
to be necessary in light of the "tremendous increase in black
nationalist activity". Such activity was seen as dangerous to
the national security,The Bureau's GOINTELPRO efforts were
further rationalized by William B. Saxbe, Attorney General of
the United States, in Congressional testimony on November 22,
197^. In regards to why GOINTELPRO-Black Extremists was in¬
stituted and maintained by the FBI, Saxbe asserted that",,,the
activities of these extremists were marked by violence, arson
and bombings" and that "the activities of many of these extre¬
mist groups included police shootings and, as is well known,
the fostering and fomenting of riots and other civil distur¬
bances in cities all across the land." Saxbe coupled these
alleged black nationalist activities with the assertion that
"these activities were led by or included individuals who pub¬
licly proclaimed their association with the political doctrines
or leadership of hostile countries, including Communist nations
Saxbe*s rationale, however, ignores the primary purpose
of GOINTELPRO-Black Extremists as stated by the FBI Director
on August 25, 1967. The program's efforts were not based on
the supposedly apolitical nature of FBI law enforcement as he
implies. The Bureau's aims were meant to "expose, disrupt,
misdirect, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black
nationalist, hate-type organizations and grouping, their lead-
^"^Ibid.
^®U,S. House, FBI Counterintelligence Programs, p, 11.
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ership, spokesmen , membership, and supporters,"^9 ^he Direc¬
tor's statement represents the Bureau's position that individuals
and organizations were subject to federal counterintelligence
efforts because of their political beliefs and activities not
because of criminal behavior as specified by the law.
The tactics used to achieve the goals of COINTELPRO help
to further illustrate how criminal detection and apprehension
were not the Bureau's primary motivation. Assistant Director
Sullivan mildly characterized the program's methods as ",,,prag¬
matic* will it work} will it get the necessary results? The
20
primacy of civil liberties on occasion gave way to expediency,"
FBI documents indicate that most of the tactics used fell
into twelve specific categories as reported by Assistant Attor¬
ney General Petersen,These categories and examples for each
are given below.
Firstly, anonymous or fictitious materials were sent to
groups or their individual ..members. This tactic was primarily
designed to prevent the unification of different organizations
along with creating factionalism within targeted groups. It is
estimated that 40^ of the Bureau's COINTELPRO efforts were of
this type. An example of this tactic can be seen on a memo¬
randum dated 4/l/68 from the SAC in New York to the Director
of the FBI, The SAC requested permission to send a letter to
^^August 25, 1967 letter to SACs from the Director of theFBI,
20
Sullivan, "Personal Observations and Recommendations on
Privacy”, p, 726,
^^U.S, House, FBI Oversight, pp, 198-199,
^^U,S. Senate, Intelligence Activities & the Rights of
Americans, p, 40.
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H, Rap Brovm that was designed to plant seeds of distrust be¬
tween Brown, Carmichael, and Forman. As soon as Brown was to
get out of jail the following letter was to be sent to himi
Dear Rapi
Dig this man. I got it from inside. STOKELY and
FORMAN sent you to the West Coast so that the man would
get you. They are a little too cool for you RAP Baby.
With you out of the way they can have the whole pie.
SOUL BROTHER
Secondly, another popular tactic involved giving infor¬
mation or articles to "friendly" media sources who could be
relied upon not to reveal the FBI's interests. The purpose
of this tactic was to expose targeted groups to unfavorable
publicity thus affecting their efforts to gain allies, mem¬
bers, and finances. A memorandum dated February 26, 1971 from
SAC in New Haven to the FBI Director, for example, shows pro¬
posed actions to be taken against the Black Panther Party (BPP)
in New Haven. One action was to send a letter to the editor
of the New Haven Register along with an article supposedly re¬
leased by Associated Press that would negatively portray the
living style of Huey P. Newton while also denying the BPP's
claim that the police were out to kill B^P members.^
Thirdly, the Bureau would also leak informant-based or
nonpublic information to media sources. This tactic usually at¬
tempted to discredit the target by esposing its nature, aims,
and membership to the public as interpreted by the FBI. A
^^See Appendix, Memorandum dated 4/l/68 from SAC in New
York I Memorandum dated 4/4/68 from SAC in Jackson j and an Airtel
dated 2/10/71 from SAC in Newark,
2^See Appendix, Airtel on 2/l/68 from SAC in Boston? Airtel
on 3/18/68 from SAC in Atlanta? and Memorandum on February 26,
1971 from SAC in New Haven,
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prime example of how this tactic took form can be seen in a
memorandum sent to the FBI Director from the SAC in New Orleans
on 3/28/68. As a disruptive tactic aimed at the Student Non¬
violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the New Orleans field
office proposed to contact a "trusted source in one of the wire
services such as AP or UPI" who could see to the national dis¬
tribution of an article claiming SNCC had raised more than the
$30*000 necessary to free H, Rap Brown on bail. The article
would go on to question what SNCC did with the money in the hope
25
of causing dissension within the black community.
Fourthly, normally advising local, state, and federal
authorities of civil and criminal violations by individuals would
not be considered beyond the expected duties of the FBI, How¬
ever, such practices were among the COINTELPRO methods and can¬
not be considered as expected duties. The disruption and harass¬
ment of targets were frequently the purposes as this tactic was
utilized, Memphis, for example, members of the BPP and other
leftist groups were harassed and arrested by the local police
on the basis of evidence supplied by the Bureau, As a result
of these arrests a free breakfast program was successfully dis¬
rupted,^^
Fifthly, FBI informants were often used as agents provo¬
cateur, They often disrupted a group's activities by causing
dissension or exploiting disputes. These agents were often
^^See Appendix, Memorandum dated 3/28/68 from SAC in New
Orleans} and a letter on 8/5/68 from SAC in Albany.
^^See Appendix, Memorandum on April 5* 1968 from SAC Den¬
ver; and a Memorandiun dated 2/26/71 from SAC in Memphis,
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instigators of confrontations with local law enforcement agen*p
cies. Two examples of this tactic are found in a teletype
dated February 13» 1971 from the San Francisco field office to
the Director and in a memorandum dated 3/l/71 from the SAC in
Houston to the FBI Director. These communications respectively
state that the leadership of the BPP was in disruption because
of the suspicion that there was an informer within the ministry
while in Houston the Peoples Party II leader was killed in a
shootout with the police. It was believed by many that the
shootout was set up by informers.^^
Sixthly, employers of targeted individuals were often ap¬
proached in attempts by the Bureau to get targets fired or to
pressure them to stop their activities. The Bureau, in one in¬
stance, contacted the bishop of a Catholic priest that allowed
his church to be used in the breakfast program of the local
chapter of the BPP. As a result of this contact, the priest
was transferred.^®
Seventhly, another ploy to adversely affect the financial
status of targets was to inform businesses and persons with
whom subjects had economic dealings of their "questionable"
politics. On September 17, 1968, the FBI headquarters was ad¬
vised that the Pittsburgh field office had succeeded in blocking
the awarding of a $150,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation to
^7see Appendix, Airtel on 2/II/71 from SAC in New Orleans*
a Teletype dated February 13, 1971 from San Francisco* and a
Memorandum on 3/l/7l from SAC in Houston.
^®See Appendix, Memorandum dated 2/28/68 from SAC in New
York
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a group who was in possession of "several pistols". As a re¬
sult of this action the organization became defunct,
Eighthly, the Bureau used the investigative technique of
interviews as a covert disruptive tactic during COINTELPRO,
Members of targeted groups were openly questioned as the FBI
let them know that the Bureau was aware of their activities.
These sessions were sometimes used to develop informants out
of particular members, A 9/3/69 memorandum from the Los Angeles
SAC to the FBI Director boasted that as a result of the inter¬
view program the membership in Ron Karenga's United Slaves (US)
organization dropped approximately fifty per cent,^®
Ninthly, the use of religious and civil leaders and or¬
ganizations in disruptive activities was not beyond the means
employed by the FBI, The ministers, professionals, and small
businessmen used here were often quite effective in injuring
the recruitment drives of groups ignoring their Bureau inspired
pleas to work less disruptively, Martin Luther King, Jr, worked
too disruptively as far as the Bureau was concerned. An Airtel
dated 3/25/68 from the SAC in Mobile to the FBI Director cites
that field office’s attempt to dull King’s efforts to organize
his Washington Spring Project, The ego of a local congregation
leader was played upon as the FBI manipulated him to discourage
his members from participating in the project,
29see Appendix, Memorandum dated September 17, 1968 from
G,C, Moorej and a Memorandum on 9/2/69 from SAC in Jackson,
^®See Appendix, Memorandum on 8/30/68 from SAC in Memphis!
and a Memorandum on 9/3/69 from SAC in Los Angeles,
^^See Appendix, Airmail dated 3/25/68 from SAC in Mobile,
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Tenthly, the Bureau also released FBI file inforinfi.tiQn
in order to influence the results of political or judicial pro¬
cesses in which targets were involved. One such example of
this practice was directed at a
student who was a leader of the Afro-American Action Com¬
mittee who had been arrested in a demonstration at a uni¬
versity, The bureau sent an anonymous letter to the county
prosecutor intended to discredit her by exposing her 'sub¬
versive connections'I her adoptive father was described as
a Communist Party member. The Bureau believed that the
letter might aid the prosecutor in his case against the
student-^^
Eleventhly, informing the subjects' families or others
of targets' radical or immoral activity was also done by the
FBI under COINTELPRO, Evidence of this practice can be seen in
a memorandum filed in Washington by the Cleveland field office.
This memorandum requested permission to make "anonymous calls
to the subject's wife alleging infidelity with his traveling
companions and/or co-workers",This particular type of tactic
was labeled as being "abhorrent in a free society" by Senators
during investigatory hearings into the intelligence practices
of various govern^mn^agencies,
Twelvethly, this final category includes various miscel¬
laneous items some of which are clearly illegal. Surreptitious
entries, forgery of a group leader's signature stamp, and printing
a group's business card for fradulent purposes are examples
12^ U,S, Senate, Intelligence Activities of the FBI, p, 58,
33ibid,, p, 55.
^^See Appendix, Airtel dated 2/17/71 from the SAC in San
Francisco,
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of counterintelligence measures falling under this category.35
The FBI's primary consideration in developing its domestic
intelligence program against black political activists seems to
have been how expeditiously the tactics realized the stated
goals of the program. The propriety of the methods was seldom,
if ever, questioned.
The lack of propriety can be further illustrated not only
by the nature of the tactics used in COINTELPRO-Black Extremists
but also by the wide variation in the types of groups and indi¬
viduals targeted by the program^ Even though the Bureau initi¬
ally stipulated that counterintelligence measures were to focus
on subversive, violence-prone organizations, investigations were
extended to include subjects whose subversive influence or po¬
tential for violence was at most minimal,
A reason for this lack of investigative discrimination
stems from applying broad and imprecise labels to entities during
the program. The following labels appear in Bureau documents
as subjects for COINTELPRO-Black Extremistsi "persons with'anar¬
chistic or revolutionary beliefs' or who were 'espousing the
line'of revolutionary movements"! general racial matters; hate
organizations I rabble rousers; key activists; black nationalists;
agitators; and key black extremists,^ These criteria are
clearly political rather than criminal areas stipulated for
Bureau investigations,
35
U,S, Senate, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans Book II, final report of the Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities,
94th Congress, 2nd session, p, l66,
36 Ibid,, p, l8l.
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Further, the specific groups and individuals investigated
under one or more of the above labels exemplifies the political,
noncriminal basis for FBI intelligence investigations. Among
the groups subjected to counterintelligence measures were the
Nation of Islam, the Southern Cristian Leadership Conference,
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Congress of
Racial Equality, the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, the Black Panther Party, the Republic of New
Africa, the Revolutionary Action Movement, and Black Student
Unions throughout the entire country. This small sampling
from the list of investigated organizations adequately indicates
the sweeping nature of FBI counterintelligence. A Senate re¬
port cites unproven innocence as reason enough for FBI intelli¬
gence investigations.^"^
This same reasoning holds true for individuals being scru¬
tinized by the Bureau. Martin Luther King,Jr., for example, was
investigated on the basis that he might have been a Communist
sjrmpathizer, FBI headquarters repeatedly ignored field offices'
reports that he had no Communist ties. It was insisted that un¬
til substantial evidence was found that indicated King was anti¬
communist, he was to be considered "guilty until proven innocent".^®
George C. Moore, the FBI Intelligence Division Supervisor
of Black Nationalist Affairs, said that individuals and organi¬
zations were targeted because of their propensity for violence;
their radical or revolutionary rhetoric and actions; and their
^"^Ibid,, pp. I8l, l82.
38lbid., pp. 20, 21.
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infiltration by Communists, Moore explained further before
Congressional investigators that the "potential" of dissident
39
activity was enough to justify Bureau investigations. Such
investigations amounted to sustained governmental monitoring
of political activity in the absence of any indication of crimi¬
nal conduct.
The FBI's standards for investigation in the late 1960s
and early 1970s represents a complete reversal of standards
stated by Attorney General Stone in 1924, He stated that "The
Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other
opinions of individuals,"
During COINTELPRO-Black Extremists the FBI operated to
control the ideas and associations of individuals and groups
that it determined to be a threat to the domestic tranquility.
As a result, intelligence practices flagrantly violated the




CONCLUDING ASSESSMENTS OF COINTELPRO
The character of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists as protrayed
by its historical antecedents, policies' objectives and tactics
qualifies it as being political in nature. The FBI did not use
the program as an apolitical tool of law enforcement. The Bureau
was not concerned with adherring to the parameters set by the
Stone Standard, During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the FBI
was not only concerned with but also sought to repress the opini¬
ons and lawful conduct, political or otherwise, of individuals
and groups.
This repressive tendency of the Bureau did not appear sud¬
denly out of the clear, blue sky. The presence of domestic
counterintelligence developed from the Bureau's traditional
treatment of political dissidents. The policies during the
post-World War I Red Scare and Palmer Raids are illustrative
of later government behavior during the Cold War and McCarthy
era. FBI pressure on the Communist Party, the Socialist Wor¬
kers Party, and other leftist organizations acted as precedent
for their operations to counter black activism in the 1960s and
early 1970s.
It can be clearly seen that the policies stated at the
outset of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists do not seek to merely ap¬
prehend federal law breakers. The program's objectives were to
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disrupt, neutralize, harass, and discredit targeted individuals
and groups regardless of their noncriminal opinions and activi¬
ties, These objectives were accompanied with the lon^ange
goals of destroying the targeted dissidents' recruitment and
fundraising capabilities. The extralegal nature of these poli¬
cies resulted partly from a lack of either a clear legislative
mandate or definitive executive directive.
Another indication of the political nature of the Bureau's
COINTELPRO-Black Extremists program appears after examining the
type of tactics used to achieve its objectives. The legality
and propriety of these tactics meant little. The only para¬
meters observed were the avoidance of public embarassment to
the Bureau and the specific tactics' degree of effectiveness.
The United States Congress' investigation into the details
of the FBI's domestic intelligence activities resulted in vari¬
ous findings and recommendations that are meant to prevent future
abuses. The Senate's findings and recommendations can be found
in the final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmen¬
tal Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, This
report accurately represents the entire Congress' response to
COINTELPRO, Their reaction must be understood if an accurate
assessment of domestic counterintelligence is sought.
The summary findings of the Senate's Select Committee place
the government's entire intelligence community in a bad light.
The committee offered seven major findings revealed by its in¬
vestigation along with thirty-four subfindings which detail CO¬
INTELPRO and its counterparts which operated in other govern-
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mental agencies. The major findings are that* (l) agencies'
programs often violated and ignored the lawj (2) the domestic
intelligence activities were excessively overbroad; (3) there
was excessive use of intrusive techniques; (4) covert action
was used to disrupt and discredit domestic groups; (5) there
were political abuses of intelligence information; (6) there
were inadequate controls on the dissemination and retention of
information; (?) deficiencies in administrative controls and
accountability existed.^
The research done in this study, to a large extent, sub¬
stantiates these findings and various subfindings. They seem
to be valid and comprehensive. However, it must be pointed out
that full access to the files of the various security agencies,
including the FBI, was never gained by Congressional or Executive
investigators. Furthermore, when sensitive material was released
it was frequently censored by Bureau officials. Yet, these
censored, incomplete files were adequate enough for conclusions
and recommendations that were to be offered.
The conclusions offered by the Senate is critical of the
FBI’s intelligence operations. It is stated that, "The Commit¬
tee's fundamental conclusion is that intelligence activities
have undermined the constitutional rights of citizens..." This
conclusion also holds that wrongs have occurred because the
^U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans Book II, the final report of the Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence
Activities, 94th Congress, 2nd session, p. 137. Also to be
found in this report are the various subfindings of the com¬
mittee .
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the "checks and balances designed by the framers of the Consti-
2
tution to assure accountability have not been applied."
The recommendations following this conclusion are based
on the belief that the extralegal activities of the FBI's
domestic intelligence program were an aberration of the system.
The Congress maintains that the constituional system adequately
allows for the protection of the freedoms of speech, association,
and privacy which were often violated by domestic counterintel¬
ligence. The recommendations offered follow this reasoning, in
that the controls suggested are meant to place intelligence ac¬
tivities in a more acceptable context.
Broadly stated, these recommendations are« (1) intelligence
agencies are subject to the rule of lawi (2) the Central Intel¬
ligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and military ser¬
vice and Defense Department investigative agencies should be pre¬
cluded from domestic security activities; (3) non-intelligence
agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Postal
Service should be barred from domestic security activities; (4)
federal domestic security activities should be limited and con¬
trolled to prevent abuse without hampering criminal investiga¬
tions or investigations of foreign espionage; (5) the respon¬
sibility and authority of the Attorney General for oversight
of domestic intelligence operations must be clarified and streng¬
thened; (6) administrative rulemaking and increased disclosure
should be required; (?) civil remedies should be expanded; (8)
criminal penalities should be expanded; (9) vague anti-sedition
^Ibid., p. 289.
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laws, such as the Smith Act, should be either amended or re¬
pealed} (10) broadened access to intelligence agency files
should be provided to the General Accounting Office since it
is the investigative arm of Congress} and (11) Congressional
oversight should be intensified,^
A critical view of the Congress' position on domestic
intelligence should consider the basic assumptions upon which
these conclusion and reommendations are based. The Senate in¬
vestigative committee assumes that the government's power to
conduct domestic intelligence activities is a necessary and
proper role. Operations that are designed to insure "domestic
tranquility" and that "provide for the common defense" are ac¬
ceptable,^
A second assumption is that the government will exercise
its power to conduct domestic intelligence activities to the •
fullest extent in times of crisis. The 1960s and early 19?0s
saw a near complete realization of just how far the government
would clandestinely go to preserve the status quo. The Congress
sees its only duty here as drawing the line between legal dis¬
sent and criminal conduct which can become subject to intelli¬
gence operations,^
Other assumptions held by this investigative body are,
first, that past excesses allowed by advanced technological ca¬
pability can be controlled by statutory restraints} and, second,
3lbid,, pp, 296-339.
^Ibid., p. 289,
5lbid. The basic assiimptions of the Committee are stated
on pp, 289-290.
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that despite failures for five decades of officials to obey the
law, abusive, domestic intelligence practices can be avoided by
administrative controls.
All of these assumptions guided the committee's judgment
as recommendations were formed to meet the critical findings
of their investigation. However, a closer examination of the
investigatory report need not focus on its specific findings.
Because the scope of this study is not broad enough and because
of a lack of resources to validate each finding the factual
materials will not be questioned. Much of the remaining focus
will therefore be upon the basic assumptions underlying the
recommendations.
Firstly, the assumption that the government's power to
conduct domestic intelligence remains unquestioned must be exa¬
mined, This power is said to be necessary for the maintainance
of domestic tranquility. Whose tranquility are the committee
investigators speaking of? Obviously, the preservation of the
statusoquo is of primary importance as intelligence programs
operate. It would therefore appear that any organized, politi¬
cally dissident behavior would be defined as threatening the
nation's internal peace. Such activities would qualify as
gets for intelligence operations. Despite the Congress' public
outcries that the civil liberties of all citizens must be pro¬
tected they affirm that noncriminal, politically dissident ac¬
tivities must be subject to governmental approval. Historically,
such approval has not been gained by groups critical of the
status quo. This report does not alter that tradition. The
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recommendations that are offered are only suggested restraints
to protect groups and individuals deemed politically safe from
intelligence excesses.
The second assumption, that the government will exercise
its power to conduct domestic intelligence activities to the
fullest extent in times of crisis, must also be examined. Again,
it can be seen here that despite the Congress' call for "funda-
me»tal reform", the government's role as protectors of the status
quo does not change. This assumption only substantiates the
Bureau's claim to use any means necessary in quelling distur¬
bances of the domestic tranquility. When such means will be used
is not precisely stated. Nor is it specified who will determine
such a time. In light of history, this point becomes paramount.
For example, a time of crisis as defined by President Richard
Nixon was the Watergate scandal while President Lsmdon Johnson
defined,it as the era of anti-war protests. Traditionally,
times of crisis have been defined in personal terms by executive
officials as vast governmental resources were directed against
groups and individuals advocating noncriminal, dissident posi¬
tions.
Another assiamption which must be briefly focused upon is
that the advanced technological capability that has resulted in
many past intelligence abuses can be controlled by statutory
restraints. Because the role of electronic surveillance is a
study that is too broad for the scope of this paper only one
point will be made here. History has shown that technological
advances are often made beyond the pace assumed by legislative
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controls. Laws passed by Congress to control various devices
and to protect the rights of citizens are either obsolete in a
short time or are so vague until their purposes are often cire
ciunvented.
The last assumption examined here is that the past excesses
of intelligence activities can be prevented in the future by
statutory restraints and administrative controls. Of all the
assumptions, this one is probably the most fanciful. This posi¬
tion denies two factors. Firstly, the enforcement of statu¬
tory restraints upon federal law enforcement agencies requires
that someone associated with those agencies knows and is wil¬
ling to reveal violations while also expecting them to have the
means with which to enforce statutes that have been.violated.
These conditions have rarely, if ever, existed.
Secondly, the effectiveness of administrative controls
over federal law enforcement agencies has seldom been enough
to prevent abuse. The committee's assumption ignores the role
administrative officials played in past intelligence activities.
Not only have officials formulated policies within intelligence
agencies that routinely violated citizens' rights but they also
hid those programs' objectives and tactics from government and
civilian personnel not allied with their cause. To expect
these same officials to reverse their course and in doing so
incrimminate themselves and their colleagues is not rational.
The historical evidence denies the committee's assumptions,
particularly the last one. For instance, an examination of FBI
domestic intelligence programs illustrates that the Bureau's
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Director repeatedly avoided obeying the policies of his superior,
the Attorney General. A typical example of this is found in
Chapter II of this study where the orders of Attorney General
Biddle were circumvented by the Director.
In summary, anticipating agencies conducting domestic in¬
telligence to avoid abusive use of their resources is not rea¬
sonable, Statutory restraints, administrative controls, and
other reformatory measures are not designed to eliminate the
reoccurence of another COINTELPRO-Black Extremists, At best
the domestic intelligence community can only be expected to be
more careful about being publicly embari^e^sed.
The Senate's report performs one vital function regard¬
less of its flaws. Its findings, conclusion, and recommendations
serve to quiet the critics of the intelligence community’s past
domestic abuses. The condemnations it offers regarding past
abuses and the parameters it suggest be set on future domestic
intelligence activities appear to verify the vitality of the sys¬
tem of checks and balances.
However, upon a closer look, the report fails to recommend
the elimination of political policing by federal agencies, the
statutory restraints suggested to prevent future abuses were never
made into law, and the administrative controls proposed to curb
intradepartmental intelligence abuses * ignore the historical
roles of various officials as domestic political dissidents be¬
came targets for counterintelligence. The policy and tactics
of COINTELPRO-Black Extremists exemplify the nature of counter¬
intelligence in the United States.
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To expand the Counterintelligence Program designed
to neutralize militant black nationalist groups from 23 to
41 field divisions so as to cover the great majority of black
nationalist activity in this country. i
BACKGROUND:
By letter dated August 25, 1967,23 field offices
were advised of a new Counterintelligence Program designed
to neutralize militant black nationalists and prevent violence
on their part. Goals of this program are to prevent the coalition
of militant black nationalist groups, prevent the rise of a ‘{
leader who might unify and electrify these violence-prone '\
elements, prevent these militants from gaining respectability '
and prevent the growth of these groups among America’s youth, /
CURRENT PpELOPMENTS:
In view of the tremendous increase in black nationalist
activity, and the approach of summer, this program should be
expanded and these goals should be reiterated to the field.
Attached airtel also instructs the field to submit periodic
progress letters to stimulate in this area. j {/ -
Attached airtel also reminds^ the f-ield that counterintel¬
ligence suggestions to expose these miliigQj;^,j2X—nguty^lize
them must be approved by the Bureau.
ACTION:
6 MAR 11 ISfiB
That attached airtel expanding tbts. program, defining
goals and instructing periodic progress letters be* submitted
be sent Albany and the other listed field offices.
6
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RB: COUin'ERINTELLIGENCE FROGRAU
CK KATIONALIST-UATK CROUPS .
.
•y
■ > -y I »
•• •. • . -f't ■
[BACKGROUND
rj,L' ".»■ ——' ■—
. >
K'’W
By'letter dated 8/25/67 the folloving offices' '.V'-'* -*•
ttore advised of the beginning of a Countcrintelllgonce

































Each of the above off ices was-- to designate’a “
**. Special Agent to coordinate this program," Replies to this
• letter indicated an interest in counterintelligence against
oilitent block nationalist groups that foment violence and •*. *
several offices outlined procedures which bad been effective ..
.in the'past.. For example, Washington Field Office had . - ..
furnished infornjQtion about a new Nation of Islam (KOI) • V’’-'* *'
grade school to appropriate authorities .in the District 'i
of Columbia who investigated to determine if the school . ‘
■■ conformed to District regulations for private schools. In . • .
the process WFO obtained background information on the parents
of each pupil. ..s';.:.; •: v
• -T *- • ■ *-■ ‘ T-,-' *• ••••*•.•
• ; The Revolutionary Action'Uovement (RAH),.a pro- v
:• 'Chinese communist group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa./ '*. •*
in the somner of 1907. The Philadelphia Office alerted
’.•.local police; who then'put RAH leaders under close scrutiny.
They were arrested on every possible charge until they could
, *; no longer make bail. As a result, RAH loaders spent, imost of the.
'•‘i ’’- Bumraer in Jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place.'
-V . * • .
• m ■ i








Alrtel to SAC, Albany * • • ^
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK KATICWALIST-HATE GROUPS ;
t >
/ .
|hationali6t activity, 'and interested in counterintelligon
coordinate this progrnja. ‘This Agent will bo resixjnslb
%or the periodic progress letters being requested, but enc
; Agent iporking this typo of case should participate in the
formulation of counterintelligence operations. *,
< i . . • II . • '
•'
• ‘C* ’ • !
GOALS v V • /
■
^ ■
* ■ ‘ Por aiaxlniua effectiveness of tho Counterintelligence
Program, and to prevent wasted effort, long-range goals are
being set. ^
1. Prevent the coalition of militant black
In unity there is strength; a trulsa
triteness. An effective
nationalist grroups.
that is DO less valid for all its
coalition of block nationalist groupstdght be tho first
step toward a real "Hou Mau" in America, the beginning of
a true black revolution. . A"'
• 2; Prevent the ride’of a/ '^aosslah" who could ;
unify, and electrify,.the billtant'black nationalist'mdvenont.
Malcolm X might hnvo boon such a *lnessiah;'* he Is the martyr
of the Bovemont today, Martin Luther King, Stokoly Carmichael .,
and Elijah Muhanmed all aspire to this position. Elijah
Muhammod is less of a tliroat because of his age. King could
be a very real contender for this position should ho abandon
his supposed ^obedionco” to *Vhltc, liberal doctrines” ' . ■
(nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism. Carmichael •'./
has the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this way.
*. • •
3, ■ Prevent violence on the part of black ' ’
nationalist g^roups. l^ls is of primary importance, and Is, ' ’
of course, a goal of our Investigntivo activity; It should
also be a goal of the Counterlntolllgoncc Program, Through •
counterintelligence It should bo'possible to pinpoint .potential
troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise t^olr
potential for violence.
« * mf * • • ••.*•.' * * ** •• • » - •
4. Prevent militant black nationalist grouF^ and
leaders from gaining rcGpoctoblllty, by discrediting them .
to three separote segra'cnts of "tho" comraun 11y. Tho goal of . *.
Tiscrodltlng black nationalistsmust bo handled tactically'*
.n throe ways. Tou must discredit these groups and
individuals to, first, tho rosponsiblo Kegro cotsnunlty.
jocond, they must bo discredited to the white community,/'
4 •
'« '
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Airtel to SAC, Albany
BE: COUNTERIOTELLICENCB PP.OGRAIt
BLACK. KATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
both' tho rosponslblo comaunlty and ;tO **llberolB" vho havo]
VOS vices of sympathy for militant black nationalist eiopl]
:because they are Kogroes, Third, those groups must bo-
^discredited in the eyps of Kegro radicals, the followers
of tho Bovenent, This last area requires entirely different ■
tactics from the first tro. Publicity about violent tendencies
and radical statements merely enhances block nationalists ^
to tho last group; It adds Respectability" in a different
•way. ■ : . . • ’/ •• . •
> S. A final goal should bo to prevent the long*,
range growth of militant black natlbnallst organizations,'-'
copcciaTTy among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these’ ,
groups from converting young people must be dcvolopod., ‘ *
» • •
, •
Besides these five goals countcrintolllgenco is
‘a valuable part of our regular investigative program as.lt
often produces positive Information. • "
TARGETS
. •*
Prlmory targets of the’’Counterintelligence Program,:.
Block Kat Iona list-note Groups, should be the most violcfnt ■ •
and radical groups end their leaders* ■ Wo should emphasize
thoso leaders ond organizations that are nationwide in scope
and ore Ko.*5t copnblo of disrupting “^hls country. Thesej;
targets should include tho radical and vlolonce-prona .-
leaders, members, and followers of the: . . * * '
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Connlttco (SNCC),. '
Southern Christian Leadership Conforonco (SCLC)»-’. *
RevolutionatTT Action Movement (RAM). • ' *
Nation of Islam (NOl)
f>’ Offices handling theso cases and those of Stokoly"*:
Carmichael of SNCC, H. Rap Brown of SNCC, Martin Luther King
of SCLC, Maxwell Stanford of RAM, and Elijah Muhatamed of
NOl, should be alert for countorintelligence suggestions,.-
INSTRUCTIONS
hould:
Within 30 days of .the date of this letter each ofSco
> •
ffle
i| •/ •;W' M
(4^ai f.1. Advise tho Bureau of the identity of the 6x>ct^a








Alrtol to SAC, Albany .-




* •H..* » ^ ‘ ^ ’■ ■ -3 :'•• • ,2,\ Subalt a very succinct'eusuoary of the black ^
ationalist aovomcQt in the field office territory.- Include":.* *-•'
inne, number of iQeinbcz*a end degree of activity of each blecj^u-*.'
nationalist group, •.Also state your estimate of each grouife\T * .
pi*oponsity for violence. This is for target evaluation only/
not for record purposes. Second, list Rabble-Rousor Index . .
subjects’who are nllltaDt black nationalists and any other,.O"
nilitant black nationalist'loaders who night bo future ,
targets of counterintelligence action bocouso of their pro^^ '
penalty for violence.' Include a nlnlnua of baclcground .
j^rson ^listeda few descriptive sentences
.
, * • • '.'V
3, List those organizations and individuals
you consider of such potential danger no .to bo considered
for current counterintolligcnco. action. Briefly Justify
each target. ; . . ' . '* •
'• • •’ - •: '
'
4. Submit any suggestion you have for overall
counterintelligence action or the administration of this,.*
program. Suggestions for action against any specific •-









5, Submit, by separate letter, auggostlona for
counterintelligence action against the targets previoubly . .
listed as fiold-vide.. These should not be general, such
as "publicize Stokcly Carmichael*6 travel to oomnunist ' **
countries,"., but should be specific as to target, what is • •.
to be done, whnjt contacts are to be used, and all othe^
Information ncooed for the Bureou to approve n counter- ..
intelligence operation.' . » .* , • ' • '
•
. . i ‘ • >
Thereafter, on n ninoty-dny-basis, each office •
is to submit a progress letter Bumnanzing counterintelligence,
operations proposed during the period, operations effected^
and tangible results. Any changes in the overall black *
nationalist novemont should be summarized in this letter.
This should include nev organizations, new leaders, and any
changes in data listed under number two above. Suggestions
for countorintelllgcnco operations should not be set out
in this progress letter. Use the following captions:
: •
fieing 1-Jbf Coui
1. Operations Under Consldorctlon, 2. Oporotioi^ •*.*
Effected, 3. Tangible Results, and 4, Pevelopnenti -'v-tr'*.
• untcrinteiligonco Interest. 'Tbeso .90“dny progress .











L*tt«r to BAC, Albany
KZX COUNTER INTBLLI CENCZ PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - BATS CROUPS
/ _ ’
against the Comnunlst Party and related organizations.or th
prograa entitled '^Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security^
^iaruptlon-ol'Hate Croupa,_".(Buiilo. 157-95,1 which Is directed
against Klan and bato-type groups primarily consisting of white
memberships•
All Special Agent personnel responsible for the
investigation of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and
their meabershlps should be alerted to our counterintelligence
Interest and each Investigative Agent has a reBi>onsibility to
call tosthe attention of the counterintelligence coordinator
suggestions and possibilities for Implementing the program*
You are also cautioned that the nature of this now endeavor
is such that under no circumstances should the existenee of
the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate
within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations
and techniques considered under the program*
No counterintelligence action under this "program may
be initiated by the field without specific' prior"Bureau
authorization. ]
You are urged to take an enthusiastic and imaginative
approach to this new counterintelligence endeavor and the Bureau







. Airtel to SAC, Albany
.. ■“ -- • i''*-: ,
.RE: 'COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
/black NATIONALIST-HATE CROUPS-'Vv . . •• •**-#: • >•’ '
I >: >:••'!. ■•• ■ : :' - • V : '• • ‘ ^v'-*'I :•; •‘I-.'1 '- v The effectiveness of counterintelligence depends
\-on the quality and quantity of positive infonoation ••'S—^i-
-.ava'ilable regarding the target* and on the .imagination and •. •
initiative of Agents working the program. The response of » '
the field to the Counterintelligence Program against the , ,
Communist Party, USA,‘ Indicates that a superb Job can be




Counterintelligence operations'must be approved ’v;:
by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each' V
operation must be designed to protect the Bureau’s interest •
60 that there is no possibility of embarrassment to the )
Bureau. Beyond this the.Bureau will give every possible
consideration to your proposa)3. • > i •
t • * •
ivv
NOTE; .
See memorandum G. C. Moore to Ur. W. C. Sullivan
































DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006) date: h/l/S^
i
SAC, NEW YORK (100-I6ll40) (P)
C COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
^CIAL INTELLIGENCE
It is suggested that the following letter be sent
to H. RAP BROV/N as soon as he gets out of , Jail.
Dear HIP:
Dig this man. I got it fz\>m inside. STOKELY and
FORMAN sent you to the West Coast so that the man would get
you. They are a little too cool for you RAP Baby. Wlthy>u
out of the way they can have the v;hole pie.
SOUL BROTHER
The above letter designed to plant seeds of dis¬
trust between BROWN, CARIilCHAEL, and FORMAN will be typed /
double spaced on plain white paper. ^
The typing of the letter and envelope will be handled
by the NYO. The letter v;lll be mailed from a mailbox In NYC and ;
sent to BROV/N as soon as his address can be determined.
I
Bureau authority Is requested for the NYO to proceed


















BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE PROGRAM
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
Rc Bureau alrtel to Albany, dated 3/4/68,
and Jackson letter to the Bureau, dated 4/4/68*
In accordance vith Instructions from Item
#5 of-Page 5 in the first reference above, the follow
ing suggestions are forwarded as possible counterintel¬
ligence actions against previously determined field
wide targets:
I. SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE (SCLC)
MARTIN LUTHER KING
A. KING has changed the date of his
Washington Spring Project (WSF) on several occasions;
he has, on occasion, announced his anticipated presence
at various locations, and then send a top aide instead
of appearing himself; he has periodically changed the
dates of his appearances in certain geographic areas*
Many times, announcements were made when KING was to be
at a specific WSP meeting in order to draw a crowd, when
actually it was known in advance by KING that he would
not attend*
•‘‘•C* / .1;»
'2 - Bureau (RM) (AM)
2 - Jackson (100-980) * •' A... 1-63
TF/bjk ,
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It is felt the above ^considerations can
be exploited to cause confusion in the ^efforts of KING
and his group, and to cause Negro dissatisfaction with
V'is operating procedures. This could accomplished
by the following:
1) When KING is actually to
be at a gathering, have informants circulate false in¬
formation as to time, date and location of KING's ap¬
pearance, or variations of each, i.e., correct time and
place, but different location, correct location, but
different date, et cetera. ^ i
2) Have informants circulate
information that KING is to be at announced local meet¬
ings of SCLC groups when, in fact, he will not be present.
3) Announce, through informant,
when KING to be at specific place, that this is only a
guise to draw a crowd, and only local leaders will be
present, excluding KING.
i.
B. KING and his top aides dress expen¬
sively, generally travel via first class means , and
stay at first class accommodations usually in predomi¬
nately white areas of cities he visits. Recently, in
Memphis, KING ran from his followers when violence erupted
during a march he was leading there. It is felt the above
two considerations could be linked to discredit KING and
his aides with poor Negroes who he is seeking support from.
This could be accomplished by the preparation of a flyer
showing photographs of KING and aides dressed well, next
to photographs of Negroes poorly clothed; under the photo¬
graph would be data concerning his expensive tastes, ac¬
commodations, use of private airplane, and related data;
with this information would be information concerning
JN 100-980 i
king's deserting his followers during the Memphis rlotsl w.;
The key note message would be that KINQ and his aides \
are out for their own financial and physical welfare
primarily. Flyers could be prepared from newspaper
photographs of KING and HLs aides, or from some photo-
5raphs available at various field offices. Distribution
could be by anonymous mailings to poor Negro leaders,
or by placement of copies at Negro meeting places by
informants.
II. STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING
COICIITTEE (SNCC) ’
This group has discouraged Its members
from associating with whites. Information has been de¬
veloped that some leaders and top functionaries, since
the establishment of this policy, have periodically
maintained close associations,to include residing with
white girl friends. Information concerning these asso¬
ciations could be capitalized on by counterintelligence
measures to shov; the hypocrisy of these leaders and to
discredit the individuals involved with their new "Black
only" oriented associates in the same organization, and
to discredit them with leaders of other Black Nationalist
organizations withvhom they may be seeking support or
rapport.
Specifically, efforts could be undertaken
to obtain photographs of the principals involved with
their white girl friends. The flyer could then be pre¬
pared containing this photograph or photographs. Under
the pliotograph could be information regarding the princi¬
pals' position with SNCC, followed by quotations of top
SNCC leaders regarding associations with whites or
Black Separatists statements. The flyers could be mailed
anonymously to pertinent National and local leaders of
SNCC and/or to leaders of other Black Nationalist organisa¬
tions advocating Black separatism, rather than simply^ I ..
JN 100-980
f mailing letters anonymously, these letters could besent under the guise of Nation of Islam, RevolutionaryAction Movement, or other similar groups who could be
construed to be criticising as a group the individuals*
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' Because of the fact that the local BPP units ara
without leadership, finances or any viable prograuns, it •
is considered that any counterintelligence measure directed..*
at causing dissension within the local branches woxild be /
ineffective at this time; but rather a measure directed
from outside forces would be more fruitful*
. • Inforaants have continued to
-• 1:
nUbI Jerse/'ti'ty“‘Si*e known to come to Newark
to sell the BLACK PANTHER PARTY newspaper in the downtown V‘
area, as well as the^ ghetto areas* , ;
- .•* V*' ;»
It is recommended that the follov/ing letter be .‘;V.
sent to the BPP at $3 Summit Ave*, Jersey City, NJ:
•Ve have warned you before that this ihroor
town and that you and your paper should stay in • • r:.-
Jersey City* We took care of f^^^^JJ^'^^^^p^/ithout ''v'/l
any bloodshed* Maybe you will not' oe so fortunate
if you continue to sell your paper in this city%
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FROM: SAC, BOSTON (157-531)
SUBJECT: '^'COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST HATE GROUPS
INTERNAL SECURITT
Re Bulet to Albany, 8/25/67.
In connection vrlth captioned program, the Boston
Division Is submitting the following suggestion:
Boston SNCC has been promoting the idea of forming''
a United Front in Boston made up of representatives of all
Negro organizations in the Greater Boston area. This United
Front in turn would elect representatives to form a National
United Front with representatives from other cities. Through
this means, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
claims black power would be concentrated into its greatest
strength.
STOKELY CARICCCHAEL visited Boston on 1/25/68 to ^
address a meeting of representatives of Negro organizations
which had met to consider the United Front idea. The idea
has met with opposition generally because of the fact that
CARMICHAEL'S name is associated with it. To counteract this,
SNCC will attempt to have the idea supported in the Boston area
by organizations known to be more moderate, such as National
Association for Advancement of Colored People, Urban League,
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i ' It la Bxiggested that efforts being made by CAR>ttCHAEL
to form a United Front be exposed .In a news artlcle_yhl-criLu V
woul<!^alspJLnclude-the-fact8 ,that,CARMICHAlX has travele<^ln^.‘*.and'’but”of Boston using assumed narae_s_ and evasive tactlcsi In..
a~'typlcal.’criminal:.type of.’actlvity."'^ The fact that CARMICHAEL
has held secret meetings in Boston to set up plans for some ..
activity in Boston during the. summer of 1960 would also be '
>'rought-out, . , . ... , ■ .. *
would completely protect the
bureau's interest.He has, in the past, indicated a willing¬
ness to assist the Bureau in any way in a proposal of this
type and to accept complete responsibility for it.
* 'In the past the Globe has given strong support to • •• *
negro complaints against discrimination, segregation, and
poor housing. This newspaper also was a vigorous supporter
of the negro complaintitof '’de facto" segregation in the '
Boston Public School System,- For this reason it is read'by
!a much larger percentage of negroes in the Roxbury area than •'
any other Boston paper. Although the Globe has in the past'
published some articles which have been anti-Bureau in tone,
this paper has always been cooperative with the Boston Office,
It is believed the type of article suggested would get the
most exposure and be read by the greater majority of negroes’
in the Metropolitan Boston area if it appears in the Globe,
There is no_Questlpn but what the BureaxL'_s_lnterests will be
s^afe^ardedr ^ •' : * ; ? ’
It-is also suggested that certain portions of Bureau-
alrtel to Albany dated 1/19/68 entitled, "Foreign Influences*
in the Black Nationalist Movement"(racial intelligence section)
coricemlng foreign travel of STOKELY CARMICHAEL be released
'acts would inform all Iresponslble groups of the extent of.
CARMICHAEL'S travel'and contacts and would tend to alienate
^hem from SNCC activities* It is believed it would also be^.
a deterrent for any activity which militant groups may, ha'^o"'
planned for Boston for the summer of I968, •
'
•. -f:’. •* ■ . • . • .
v’ ’ • .* . •• ■ . .
•' ^ Vv











•nie Bureau might alao vrlah to consider a releaa^ofiL :
a almilar type on a national-level through Bureau aourceaf
. V
' • Since a third organizational meeting of the United *.’ /
Front la to he held aoon on an as yet unscheduled date^ if
,8requested that the Bureau give consideration to this proposal
as soon as j>08slble. "It ia believed that the sooner such an . • .
article could be released, the better effect it would have,*
since at this time, representatlvea of certain organizations
in Boston are sitting on the fence with respect to joining *'
the United.Front. ■ .* --V . - •*
. . • » - ■ • * .
In the event of Bureau approval, the Bureau's ^











FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7182)
r*̂
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM












Rc Bureau airtel to Atlanta 3/14/68.
Baltimore's susgestion of utilizing a cartoon
‘ tn depict the apparent alliance between SCLC and the NOI
has^ as the Bureau noted, definite merit. However, Atlanta
is of the opinion the Bui'eau's suggestion of a pertinent
newspaper ai'ticlc is more appropriate under the circumstances
and might lend itself to wider circulation than a cartoon«
The impact on KING of printed matter is apt to be greater than




On 2/23/66 KING met with ELIJAH MUHAMMAD in the
latter's residence in Chicago for the purpose of enlisting
MUHAMMAD'S aid in fighting Chicago slum conditions. Atlanta's
- highly confidential sources at that time never developed any
pertinent information describing KING'S reaction to or
evaluation of this meeting. Chicago sources reported the
[ meeting was not successful in developing any mutuality
or cooDeratlon mainlv because of relieious and philosophical
^ It is noted that during an SCLC retreat held in
”3 A' Atlanta in the middle of January 1968 regarding the IVSP
KING stressed that obtaining jobs or income for Negroes
would represent a mere fraction of that* which America o
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‘.the Negro throughout Its history. ' He declared America ’ .^•
owes an incalculable sum to the Negro who throughout *
his long years of involuntary servitude labored to build
this country. This language almost suggests some degree.of
adherence to teachings of ELIJAH UUHAHMAD. - ■ . •
It is suggested the proposed publicity might be .
slanted to convey the thought that the apparent alliance-
. between SCLC and the NOI possibly grew out of the former *' ;
meeting between KING and unEAMEAD; that in connection with
the WSP SCLC is "pushing" the NOI in Baltimore. This, of
course, would raise a question as to the sincerity of KING'S
current statements that the WSP is to bo based on nonviolent
techniques because the position of the NOI toward the white
man is basically one of annihilation.
• * *
While KING is currently seeking the cooperation of '
other organizations to assist with SCLC's WSP he has shown no
. willingness to use SCLC to assist any other organization. '
In effort to finance the WSP, SCLC plans to seek
. financial contributions from Negro churches. Establishing
the thought of an alliance with'the NOI which is opposed to
Christianity, may well discourage a favorable reaction on the
part of some Negro churches.
It is felt KING'S reaction to the proposed technique
would be positive for counterittelligence purposes. ■ KING
. considers himself a devotee cf the nonviolent philosophies '
, of the late MAHATHA GANDHI. To publicly align him and/or SCLC •
with the NOI should trouble him on this basis. It is
further conceivable that HUHAMIiiAD may see fit to respond to this
MAT t«« c*>rr|CM







fC^liBW HAVEN (157-785) P
CT: COINTELPRO - BXAad]^TREMISTS ' - . J
RACIAL MATTERS
. •
Rc: New Haven letters to Bureau, 12/1/70 and 2/4/71;
New Haven teletype, 2/3/71, entitled ’’BLACK PANTHER PARTY, PUBLIC
APPEARANCES, RM - BPP, COINTEI.PRO; ” Bureau airtel to Albany, ’
Et Al, 2/2/71, entitled "COINTELPRO - BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) -
DISSENSION, RACIAL MATTERS;'* and Bureau airtel to New Haven,
2/17/71.
The following is a 90-day summary of Counterintelligence
Program activities within the New Haven Division:
I / OPERATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION
New Haven is presently preparing to submit the following
proposals:
A. A letter to the editor of the "New Raven Register"
mildly chiding them for publication of a recent article concerning
the fact that HUEY P. NEWTON lives in a plush $650 per month
apartment in Oakland, California. The article was an "AP"
release but was published in conjunction with a second article///^
concerning the fact that 28 Panthers had not been killed by
police but, in fact, only the case of WILLIAM HAMPTON has tume<^)
out to be a bona fide police-Panther action. Both these articles
caused embarrassment to the Panthers locally in New Haven. .
B. The Black Panther Party in New Haven is attempting
to obtain a new headquarters at 259 Dixwell Avenue. The reason
the Panthers must vacate the present headquarters at 35 Sylvan
Avenue is the fact that they have completely destroyed this
residence and it is uninhabitable. The plumbing, electrical
^ and heating systems are in extremely bad shape.
Counterintelligence measures are under consideration




2 - New Haven^
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XI. OPERATIONS BEING EFFECTED
The anonymous letter to Clev«j:Q:^ in which the Bureau
authorized on 2/17/71 has been sent.
III. TANGIBLE RESULTS
During the month of January, numerous black businesses
were visited by Bureau Agents, New Haven. Copies of the
Counterintelligence documents entitled "Ten Point Program** and
*'Like It Is** were observed in many of these firms.
New Haven proposed a Counterintelligence measure in .
connection with the proposed television appearance of HUEY
NEWTON but this appearance was cancelled at the last moment.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERESTS
There'is a great deal of strife and internal bickering
in the New Haven BPP. The New Haven Office will make every
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ReBuairtel to Albany, 3/4/68.
The following specific suggestion under
captioned program is being submitted for the Bureau's
consideration in regard to SNCC:
i
This suggestion is being submitted by New
Orleans and, if implemented, it is believed it would
tend to cast suspicion on SNCC and its leaders among
the Negro population throughout the US.
As the Bureau is aware, RAP BROWN has been
incarcerated in the Orleans Parish Jail, at New Orleans,
La., since 2/21/68. A review of information received
from New Orleans sources and information received by
New Orleans from other field offices, reveals that SNCC
has been attempting to raise the $30,000.00 bond money
for BROWN among the Negro communities in these areas.
As a disruptive tactic, it would appear that
the Bureau might desire to contact a trusted source in
one of the national wire services such as AP or UPI
and have this individual write an article for national
distribution to the effect that SNCC and its leaders
have been soliciting funds in various areas of the
country to raise the $30,000.00 bond money for BROWN.
This article could allege that contributions were
collected which exceeded the $30,000.00 needed. However
when a final accounting was made, only approximately
$10,000.00 was turned in. As a result, SNCC leaders and
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It would appear that, if this news article
were properly prepared, it would have a damaging effect
on SNCC and place SNCC in a bad light among the Negro
-ommunity.
Future counterintelligence measures which might
benefit New Orleans will be submitted at a later date.
T.
y O'
• 1 -^.D, DeLoach
1 Sullivan
1 - *.E. Bishop












The Bureau vants to bring a highly successful *-•.
counterintelligence operation to the attention of all
counterintelligence offices, so that all offices will
be aware of the type of results that can be obtained
in this program. . .
• • * ,
The Miami Division developed a source at a
local television station and the source produced a
nows special on black nationalists and on the New Left*
Miami requested Bureau authority to furnish the sourco
background data of a public source nature when' the ^
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. ^ Jpoi*, Arfe$ne-t> ^h|^ ■. j •I The Bureau authorized the eource dataj ’
en a confidential basis andth ^ | • .
great ’deal of research vas done xSrm''^niViiyrit6'‘*and it ■
resulted In an excellent progran. The show, which ended
with quotes from the Director on the nature of the New
Loft, was so well received that the television station
received requests for a film of the show by local civic
groups.
As you are aware publicity about New Left
and black nationalist groups, especially television
coverage, sometimes enhances the stature of these groups,
At the same time, Uiami has demonstrated that a carefully * * ^ .
planned television show can be extremely effective in'
showing these extremists for what they are.' local New
Left and black nationalist leaders were Interviewed on
the show and seemed to have been chosen for either their
inability to articulate or their simpering and stupid
appearance,
Uiami furnished a film of thls^ow for Bureau
review and It was apparent that the television source
used the very best judgment In editing comments by
t^ese extremists. He brought out that they wer^ in
favor of violent revolution without their explaining
why. But he also brought out that they, personally,
would be afraid to lead a violent revolution, making
them appear to be cowards. The Interview of black
nationalist loaders on the show bad the leaders seated,
111 at ease, in bard chairs. Full-length camera shots
showed each movement as they squlraed about In their
chairs, resembling rats trapped under scientific
observation.
Each counterintelligence office should be
alert to exploit this technique both for black nationalists
and New Left types. Uiami learned from sources that those
who appeared on the show realized that It presented them
in a most unfavorable light. One oven complained to the
television station about It. This counterintelligence
operation will be of great value In the South Florida area
Retyped pace^' letter to SAC, Albany
dated 8/5/68 RE; COUNTERINTELMGENCE PROGRAM




and the Bureau hopes these results can be duplicated la
othor offices. Success in this case resulted from hard,
vork and acumen on the part of the Agents vho handled
the matter. Especially linx>oz‘tant was the choice of
individuals intorvieved as they did not have the abilitj
to stand up to a professional newsman. The fine Job of
interviewing and editing done by the news people involved
was also most important.
Each office should be alort to the possibility
of using this technique. No countorintolligcnco action
should be taken without Bureau authority.' For your
information operations of this type must bo handled
through reliable, established sources and must be set
up 80 that the FBI is not revealed as the source.
MOTE:
Sec memorandum G.C. Moore to Mr. W.C. Sullivan.
captioned as above, dated 8/1/68, prepared by
tf. * c?• ^















Re Denver letter to Bureau dated 4/3/68, bearing
Counterintelligence Progreun caption.
Denver does not feel the L’ation of Islam (MOI)
should be a target for counterintelligence action at this
tir.e. There has been no evidence any IIOI members joined in
the activities of the young people who caused minor racial
disturbances in Denver during the summer of 1967. These
disturbances were spontaneous and were caused by young
Megro people v;;io wanted more recreation facilities for the
young ;:egro population of Denver.
The Denver group of the KOI, with its 20 members,
dees not have a.large enough membership to discredit its
leaders by mailing leaflets or letters to the membership..
It Ccinnot be stated as to what reaction would
result from har'assment of the NOI members, whether it would
cause them to lose membership and disband or cause them to
become more militant.
JLf,!.the. Bureau, v;ith above facts in mind, feels
the Denver KOI group should be a target for counterintel¬
ligence action, the following are suggestions;
1, Ask Denver Fire Department to inspect building
housing KOI mosque for possible condemn^g^^”'
>/2/- Bureau (RM) AbL iN?nr»'*TTpj? (joNTAiNZD
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2. Anonymously have telephones of sembers dis¬
connected.
3. Kail letters to h’CI ir.enbers reflecting they 1
originated fx*om nembers of the "Kinutemen.” -
4. Have Denver Police Department patrol car of¬
ficers issue traffic citations to KOI members when they
leave KOI r.oscue as one or tv.’o of them make U-turnm,,,^j5p,jf^|aj^
vore done, {^^^3i^enver Police Department,
an cszablxshed source, v/oulci be used as a contact.
5. Anonymously attempt to have electricity and
v;atcr shut off in members' residences.
6. Kake telephone calls to mosque while meetings
arc in progress to disrupt meetings.
7. Anonymously furnish information.to nev7spapers
regarding leader of Denver group of KOI being a schoolteacher
in an all-vjhitc school; also, that three other members are
employees of U. S. Government. Bureau has previously been










blKL'.CTOR, FBI (100-448006). DATt:
ou =W\“;IjPHIS (100-4542) (?♦)
bject: COINTtLPnO - BLACK EXTUEMISTS
KACIAL I.1ATTEUS (PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY PARTY -
NATIONAL COiRlITfEE TO COlIBAT FASCISM)
I
2/26/71
Ho Memphis letter to Bureau 11/12/70*
90-DAY PROGRESS LETTER
I. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION :
By separate letter the Itemphis Office has requested
Burpau permission to mail to each member and known sympathizer,
of the Peoples Revolutionary Party - National Committee to
Combat Fascism (PRP-NCCF) at Memphis, Tennessee, a copy of sa
article captioned ’’Soph Class Examines Recent Panther
Rejections,*' which appeared in Harvard University student .
newspaper, **The Hilltop.** * '
It is .believed that doubt rqgardins Black Panther ;
party concepts and aims can bo created in the minds of
members and sympathizers of the PKP-NCCF by an anonymous X-
roailing'bf this article to all such members. : .X i
^.
II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BEING EFFECTED .V;;
A. The flcmphis Office continues to furnish information
of a restricted nature to trusted liaison sources and /'
newspaper sources of the Memphis Office. Considerable >
information has been furnished to trusted reporters of
local daily newspapers regarding plans and activities of
tile Black Panther Party oriented PRP-NCCF group at Memphis. .;
Due to the successes of this program, every effort is being .
made to expand the dissemination on a confidential basis of
information which can be used by local daily newspapers to




^1935 .. _* '' Buj/ U.S. Savings Bonds Btifdarlj on sbt Pajroll Snvin^x
a
Black Panther group known.




B. The anonymous mailing to selected newspapers, '
« black organizations, colleges and universities within this .
division of reprints of an article captioned **Soph Class '•
Examines Kecent Panther Uojcctions,which appeared in the ;
•harvard University student newspaper, "The Hilltop'" have
been made, but to date no information has been received '
concerning any positive results of this mailing. '
III. TANGIBLE RESULTS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS * '
The furnishing of cei'tain information on a
confidential basis to trusted local newspaper sources
Memph
received a bundle of Black Panther Party newspapers and
had' called a meeting of their racmbersliip, which included •;
a group of high school students, regarding the selling on ~
the streets of Memphis of this Black Panther Party newspaper
At this meeting it was decided that all members of the
PUP-NCCF and the group of high school students who were to
help sell this paper would meet at an abalidoncd church in, •
a Negro glietto a^ea whore the Black Panther Party papers .
would be distributed to the individuals who were to sell ••
these on the streets.
*





• V# t.'.was furnished the location of the
meeting place and ^hc time of the meeting, and it was
suggested that she be at this church with a news photographer
just prior to the appointed time of t!ic loeoting,
complied, and this resulted in an oral fight betwc^f^iuewi
of this PUP-NCCF group. It created suspicion on the part of
the membership that there was an informant in the group.
As a result of this action, no longer arc high school students
/church whore the Black Panther Party papers were distributI r- • . i
9 * This counterintelligence program Also was
^successful in disrupting the breakfast program of the
PRP.-NCCF group, Infoi-roation regarding the location of





ixistcd in the church where this pro^rran was being conduct
w»a-IHirnislKid toT is reporter visited '
the location of tne IjrlTinfiasattempted to interview
persons connected with the breakfast program, and then wrote
a derogatory article about the program and the unsanitary
conditions under which the program operated. As a result,
lletnphis City health officials condemned the church building
and the breakfast program was abandoned. . <,
IV. DEVELOPiUCNTS OF COUKTliRINTELLIGENCE INTEUEST .
It is still believed by the Memphis Office that
the best counterintelligence operation against a black
militant organization is the extremely close cooperation
between Special Agtrnts of the FBI handling racial matters
and Intelligence Units or similar Police Department squads
handling racial matters.
• .V
During the past three months, information received
from racial informants, racial sources, and ghetto infonsjants
concerning the identities of automobiles used by black ,
militants, possible criminal activity, and the use of dri^gs '
on the part of black militants has been furnisl^ed to the
Memphis Police Dcjiartment Intelligence Unit, with the request
thart 'the Special Services Squad, a select unit of officers
who patrol and handle non-routine police matters, be advised.
The furnishing of this type of Information has,




shooting / ..7 '•'/•■i*
* former member oi lne oiacK mi litant
kn(>wn as the Invad«irs, was recently
from prison after being convicted of the ambush
of a Memphis police offleer.,> 7
^
ff A'// ,/'-////• ’ y '-■* • •'*’
one of the leaders of the PftP-NCCT
r'X^Ss^'iT'gTZrtf in the first week of February, 1971,




charged with hit and run
hit and run was r<;ccived
furnished to the Memphis
iH>HMad ni n accident.
Information received from an infoi’mant of the
flcmphis Office was Irimcdintcly furnished to the Memphis
^ulicc Department to the effect that the PllP-NCCF members f
D
vho had illegally occupied an apartiacnt in a Uonphis
ii: IUU>4542 «
--
Housing Authority project were expecting to bo raided ' ''
• by the ik-'inphis Police Department in the early morning hours - ’
of 1/18/71 and as a result were sandbagging and otherwise
barricading windows and doors of this apartment** As a
* result of the information furnished to the llcmphis Police
Departmentf the Demphis Police Diipartmcnt expedited this
raid from 3:00 a.m. to around midnight, catching the .
PRP-NCCF members by surprise, catching them with guns . r-
without ammunition and without completing the sandbagging ■
and barricading of this apartment. This in the minds of
the IJcmpiJis Pol ice/Department no doubt prevented bloodshed •:
and cMiabled the Demphis Police Departiaeiit to successfully •
apprehend all subjects. ■ ^Ty’
Information from llemphis informants enabled the
llcmphis Police Department to locate and apprehend, the
day after the above arrests, two additional pgp-KGCF
members who were not in the apartment house at the time
of the above-mentioned raid.
Information furnished by Memphis informants,which
was disseminated to the Memphis Police Department, concerning
a Support ANGDLA,DAVIS Party attended by members of the
Young Workers Liberation League (YWLL) and the* PUP-WCCF,
at which party Juveniles were present, enabled the Uctnphis
Police Department )to conduct a raid on this party by Vice
Snuad ofand resulted in the arrest of Memphis subject
fa YV/LL loader at Memphis and a leader of
the Cojoraittee to Free ANGELA DAVIS. In addition the identity
of all persons at this Support ANGELA DAVIS Party was
obtained. ^ i/ *.Ujttf'’ ri
Information regarding the location and times ot ■
black militant meetings, parties and demonstrations and
the locations at which PRP-NCCF members plan to sell copies
of Dlack Panther Party newspapers and irainediately furnished
to the Memphis Police Department has resulted in close - -
surveillance by the Memphis Police Department of these : •
o&^^gs, parties, and demonstrations. It has resulted in
lie identification of people taking part, whose identity
as not known to the Memphis Office. As a side benefit,
our of the five automobiles used by the PUP-NCCF are no




















FROM SAN FRANCISCO (I$7-601) (P) IP
INTELPRO - BLACK EXTREMISTS, RN.
IP/YfC^K/i/A f t /!/y/»/- /rr^r










SPECIAL DELIVERY FROM SANTA
TO BE MAILED TO
LETTER WAS MAILED TO iw:
CRUZ, CALI/ORNIA. LATE EVENING OF FEBRUARY ELEVEN LAST,
3 CONTACTED HUEY NEWTON, STATING HE HAD RECEIVED^Vf"i.g.
SPECIAL DELIVERY LETTER THAT HUEY SHOULD SEE AND HE BELIEVED
IT WAS WRITTEN BY SOMEBODY ON THE INSIDE BECAUSE OF THE-
SPECIFICS THAT WERE SET^FORTH IN THE LETTER. CSSSStaTED
THE GUY BRINGS'IT REAL CLOSE TO HOME, SO CLOSE VERY FEW PEOPLE
ARE SUPPOSE TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT ITo HE BELIEVES HUEY
CAN NA!^ROW THE MATTER DOWN AS HE SHOULD KNOW WHO HAS THIS ^
information.
HUEY STATES HE IS DEFINITELY OF THE OPINJON THERE IS AN
iff C -
»■* U\ x) .
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* Operations Under Consideration
A V/*'
Ho specific counterintelligence operations currently - '
being effected against black nationalist elements in the .
Houston Division. Peoples Party II (PP II) continues to be ^
the most logical target for counterintelligence activity,
in that they are the only activist black militant group cur-
rently in operation in Houston even though on a very limited ■'
scale at the present time due to lack of finances and members*
arui 11 1 s ah 11 c ipal,e d
ves toward a counterintelligence !_ ;
move
Because of the current status of PP II in that . ' /
they are financially bankri:^ and all their efforts to • y
establish a free health clinic and a free breakfast program. -
have been completely negated, no significant opportunity has
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It Is felt that actions of the local authorities •
and the actions of well-placed Informants have neutralized C’
the activities of the PP II In the Houston area, and It is
anticipated that this situation will continue In the Has ton
area. - v'-.. .• ' ^ *
. • =•:* ■ VO: ••• * • V: -
TV -•• -Development of Counterintelligence Interest ’
» « i* : ?•
#.- r
• M • ’
i;,.
y*'-
As the Bureau Is aware, on 7/26/70, a confrontation .
occurred between the PP II organization and the Houston Police ,',
Department, during which the leader of the PP II was killed. .
Initially, several black militants were accused of informing ,
to the police and setting up the confrontation. I^Qvnvfir. •
during recent weeks through the activities of ‘ '
suggestions by the contacting Agent, the blamelias
to businessmen, pimps and bootleggers and currently they are**'.,^^-^^*-'-;
being bla.Tied for this'action because of the fact that PP II ^
cut in on their business when they were active. This apparently
Is catching hold in the area, and it is anticipated this will *•'. j
continue to be capitalized
"a state of distrust and chaos.
PP II organization is concerned

















TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006) '
AC, NEW ORLEANS (105-3138)
f
Vj
COINTELPROX BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) - DISSENSION
>JIM • '■ —
Re Bureau airtel to Albany, ^/2/7l. . !
• ^
This is a proposal aimed at creating national . '
dissension.
Dissension in the BPP in the past has apparently
resulted from suspicion that members vcrc informants. There,
has also been evidence of dissension as a result of the //4v
sexual promiscuity of the female membership vdth boyfriend^
husbands, etc. /'
In the present interviews with purged member • , :
he has advised that members are continually’
of each other and ouite security conscious, -if*'"'
hat been suspected as * ' '
being an informant froctr^3ii'e*“cy"t^e because he has missed
most of the shoot outs. states that most suspicion is •'
directed at those indiviouals who ask too many questions
and appear to be doing more than what their specific assign*
ment is. also stated that theft,,and embezzlement i
of Panther iunds is not condoned except when done with the
knowledge of the leadership and by the leadership.
BUS
He stated t
It is therefore suggested that he
targeted in an effort to give the false ilSpressi^ that
he is a FBI^iiformant by placing storiesyyi^^elcctcd
j^Wisting informants. ^
JU - ®.65 t i/3p>- Bureau (RM) ) »












As a second counterintelligence proposal, ,*it is^
;ggested that'-a fictitious bank account'record be created;
• in the name of HUEY P. NEWTON through an appropriate bank
which will cooperate with the Bureau confidentially,''A
photostat of a false ledger card could be prepared and Vv'i’.’VA':-::-
*mailed to national headquarters anonymously along with an
appropriate letter condemning NEWTON. The account should*' ^
show regular sizable deposits over










DIRECTOR, FBI datz: 2/28/68
SAC, NEV; YORK (100-l6ll40) (P)
••
counteriotelligence program
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE CROUPS
IS -
Re Bureau letter, 8/25/67.
• I'ivv-N/-
Bureau authority is hereby requested to place the
follov/lng counterintelligence technique into effect:
Anonymous and various other pretext telephone calls
v;lll be made to the below-listed subjects for the purpose of
disruption, misdirection and to attempt to neutralize and
frustrate the activities of these black nationalists.
These calls v;lll be made to the subjects' residence
or place of employment. i
1. STOKELY CARMICHAEL
(New York File 100-153751)













- New York ra 6 1863
Buj US. SaviniJ Bonds Rtiularljf tn tht Payroll Savings Plan ,
5 (9
RAP BROWN
(New York File IOO-I607OI)
Residing at 530 Manhattan Avenue,
New York City, with an individual
named WILLIAM HALL
(phone 865-5328)
Bnployment: National Leader, SNCC,
100 5th Avenue, New York City
(phone YU9-1313) • . •
•'* *" ■** ** “* **’’
e*«w)«Ai M9
m** ••$t ■••fiO*
• •* «f« aiC «e 9^
»M
UNI l ED STA TES c(^« ERNMENT
Memorandum
m, W, C. SULLIV>^ 0
i\
SO"
1 > Hr. UeLoach
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To advise of counterintelligence results that
[kept black nationalist extremist group from receiving$150,000 grant*
BACKGROUND;
Unity Incorporated operated a black power center
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which included a proposed
target range in the basement* The leader of the group
was in possession of several pistols. The group applied for
a $150,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation in Pittsburgh*
The Pittsburgh Office has an established source
at the Mellon Foundation and recommended advising him of
the true nature of Unity Incorporated* This was approved*
RESULTS;
Pittsburgh advised that as a result of this
counterintelligence operation Unity Incorporated did not
get the $150,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation* In
addition. Unity Incorporated is now defunct* .
...










SAC, JACKSON (100-980) (P)
■ct: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM,
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
Re Jackson letters to the Bureau dated
5/27/69, 8/4/69, and 8/26/69.
QUARTERLY PROGRESS LETTER
During the past three months, activities by
Black Nationalists at colleges and high schools in
Mississippi have been nonexistent since schools, for
the most part, have only had activities limited to
summer school with small attendance thereat.
the main Black Nationalist
extremist in th^Jackson Division, has been restricting
his activities to running a liberation school six days
a week for children, ages 10 - 14, In the Georgetown
ghetto area of Jackson.
r'y-—- ;li--- in dependent extremist,
has, except for two-day visit In August, been away from
the State of Mississippi since May, 1969. He has been
active In other States, especially Pennsylvania, In pro¬
moting the "Black Manifesto." In this latter regard, he
has presented the Manifesto at churches and before church
groups.
Muhammed's Mosque, a Nation of Islam group at
Jackson, continues to be attempting to obtain member:
and funds In the Jackson area. Their efforts In thi
regard have been minimal and the leadership Is very
discou»ged.
(lY^^rea(i l(TU4Y /* fJl Ot-<‘Uwwf>c*yoD ^KnificalioD ludvJir2lo ir- w.




I. OPERATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION
With school conunenclng in September, 1969,
attention will be directed toward Black Nationalist student
groups at colleges and high schools in Mississippi for any
indications that they are being dominated by black extremists
or preaching black extremist activities. Any positive
information developed in this regard will be carefully
scrutinized for possible counterintelligence actions.
The Jackson Division is continuing to follow
closely developments regarding the possible withdrawal
of funds from the Jackson Human Ris Pro 1ect, which is
the name given to activities of and
associates in the Jackson area. Any derogatory Information
developed regarding which is of public knowledge,
will be channelized to appropriate authorities following
normal procedure for counterintelligence measure dissemina¬
tion.
While NOI activities in the State are being
closely followed, it is felt that counterintelligence
actions at present could possibly serve to unify these
elements at a time when they are experiencing serious
internal difficulties in the recruiting and finance areas.
II. OPERATIONS BEING AFFECTSD
III. TANGIBLE RESULTS ^
'
(a) The Jackson Division, on July 30 - 31, 1969,
conducted a police • community relations two^day seminar at
the Jackson Police Department, at which about 65 officers
attended. Among topics discussed by FBI instructors were
Black Nationalist groups and the fact that police officers
should be alert to any criminal activities or acts of
violence by Negroes affiliated with black extremist groups,
t
t In the early morning hours of July 31, 1969,
two of the officers who attended the session on July 30,
1969, were on duty in a Negro ghetto area of Jackson.
They observed three bearded, militant-looking Negroes in
an older model Chevrolet cruising in the vicinity of a
|.arge gun shop in the ghetto area.
>
After closely observing this car for a few
minutes, it became apparent to the officers that the
Individuals were *'up to no good." They subsequently
stopped the car on a traffic violation and thereafter
determined that the car was stolen from New Orleans,
Louisiana, and that one of the occupants was a convicted
felon in possession of a fully-loaded carbine. These
three individuals were subsequently identified as being
affiliated with the RNA in the New Orleans, Louisiana,
area.
The driver- of the vehicle was'charged with
ITSMV and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon;
one of the passengers was charged with ITSMV and the
third passenger was charged with misprison of a felony.
All of these charges were Federal charges.
JN 100-980
Subsequently, the Negro charged with nlsprlsoti ■
of a felony was Identified from fingerprints at the , |f»
*1 Division as being identical to
d Federal fugitive from the Pittsburgh
Division, sought for almost a year on bank robbery charges.
All of the above three individuals are still in
Federal custody in lieu of $3,000 bond on each charge.
Jackson informants in the RNA have been publicizing,
discreetly, their "shock and amazement" that such hard
core criminal types had been allowed into the RNA, thereby
reflecting the RNA in a bad light in the South.
All of the above arrests were given wide dissemi¬
nation in press releases over local and national news media
channels.
— contacTed the Jackson FBI Office
indicated he was doing a background investigation
Jackson SNCC leader, and his associates. This
investigation was being conducted on behalf of the Episcopal
Church in Jackson in that under the giiise of the
Jackson Human Rights Project, had received authority for a
grant of over $6,000 for this project. Only about $2,200
had been actually given to when Episcopal Church
leaders heard rumors that pych derogatory information was
circulating regardinand his activities.
asked if the FBI had any information regarding
derogatory information concerningand his associates.
ujm,vfn7..
“V was referred by the FBI to several
police sources, white and black community leadeirs. and anti¬
poverty workers who possess information
and his associates, which included
jjcuiaafii«jl£yic-_£2Lrremist, and
Tougaloo College.
On August 27, 1969. was contacted
and referred by the FBI to an article appearing in "The
Jackson Daily News" on the evening of August 26, 1969,
»-hich reflected an Associated Press release describing
take-over of a National Student Association
Convention at El Faso, Texas .^nd demanding funds for
Negroes at this gathering. 1,:was again most
appreciative of this information, said he would research
it further, and advise his superiors accordingly.
TIOilM. Pomt Mik •
MA. IMI COfri9l
•ftA rrMii (« cr»)




SAC, MSBPUIS (100-4542) (A
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
date: 8/30/68 ;
Re Meophis letter to Bureau dated 5/22/68.
90-DAY PROGRESS LETTER
1. counterintelligence operations UNDER
CONSIDERATION
a) El forte are continuing by the Memphis
Office to place in contact with black power groups at
Memphis Negro males who have expressed a willingness to
infiltrate the local black power organization at Memphis,
Tennessee. In addition, existing Negro informants who
have previously reported information regarding NOI
activities and other ghetto sources have been contacted
and efforts are being made to have these individuals
infiltrate the local black power organization known







Buj U.S. SaviniJ Bonds "Rtiularty on tht Payroll Saiihis
r
b) Const deratioi) is being given to expanding
the policy of contacting responsible leaders of various
Negro organizations at Memphis and advising them of the
activities and dangerous potential of this Black Organizing
Project at Memphis, Tennessee. As set forth hereinafter
this counterintelligence operation has been highly successful
on the limited scale in which it has been employed at
Memphis, Tennessee, It is hoped that such a program of
contactirg responsible Negro leaders in the various
Negro organizations at Memphis will result in the dis¬
continuance of funding by various Negro organizations
of the Black Organizing pjoject, a black power group
at Memphis, Tennessee. PfjDP*
Bureau (RM)
, /Memphis •liCU’o ’ '
(1- 100-4542)
134-447, BLACPRO)
157-556, Possible Racial Violence!




c) The Memphis Office continues to maintain da^j
/ contact with the Intelligence Unit of the Memphis T
I Department and is furnishing all information whichI might be of value to the Memphis Police DepartmentI the activities of individual members of the BOP at
Memphis, Tennessee, and the aims and activities of
BOP as an organization. This close liaison has resulted
in the arrest of over seven members of BOP at Memphis,
Tennessee, during the last 90 days. The furnishing
of intelligence information of this nature has resulted
in a closer cooperation between the Memphis Police
Department and the FBI and has enabled the Memphis
Police Department to combat black power Extremists in
a more successful way,
d) Based on the success to date as set forth ' .
hereinafter of the limited divulgence of intelligence
information regarding black militant activity at
Memphis, Tennessee, to a trusted newspaper source of
the Memphis Office, this type of counterintelligence
activity is contemplated being increased. By the use
of this counterintelligence activity of furnishing
to local newspaper sources information regarding
local black power activities, numerous articles
have been written discrediting the BOP at Memphis,
Tennessee, In view of the fact that this information
has been furnished to local newspaper sources resulting
in no embarrassment to the Bureau and no leak as to the
source of this information, the Memphis Office contemplates
increasing the amount and scope of the information




II, enUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BEING
EFFECTED
a) Interview Program
The Memphis Office is continuing the interview
program, making an effort to interview all members of or
sympathizers with any black power organization at Memphis,
Tennessee. While to date, no informants have been
developed as a result of this interview program, it is
known that numerous sympathizers of the BOP at Memphis,
Tennessee, have discontinued their association and support





program of his people" has resulted in curtailing of
income to the BOP and the curtailing of nev recruits
into his organization.b)Planned Failure to Interview Known
Members of Black Power Organizations
Several of the minor members of the BOP who
would logically be interviewed have not ^en interviewed
and this has resulted in a growing suspicion on the part
of the members of BOP against these individuals who have
not been interviewed. Information has been received
indicating that the BOP membership presently considers
two of their members as possible police or FBI informants^
based on the fact that these two individuals have not been
interviewed by the FBI.c)Furnishing of Information to the
Memphis Police Department
The Memphis Office, as mentioned above, is
continuing to furnish information regarding BOP leaders
and activities at Memphis, Tennessee, to the Intelligence
Unit of the Memphis Police Department, This has resulted'
not only in increased control and policing of the black
militants at Memphis, Tennessee, but has improved the
relations between the Memphis Police Department and the
local FBI Office and has resulted in the FBI’s receiving
a great deal of information of value developed by the
Memphis Police Departnvent regarding the black nationalist
movement at Memphis, Tennessee.d)Leaking of Information to Trusted Liaison
Sources and Newspaper Sources
A great deal of information has been furnished
to trusted reporters of the local daily newspapers
regarding the militant aims and purposes of the BOP at








e) Tlio Ucmphls Office is making known the
Identity of black militants who are enrolled at the
various universities at Memphis, Tennessee, to trusted
and reliable sources at these various universities.
This has enabled these various universities at Memphis
and Nashville, Tennessee, to better control demonstrations
on these campuses and has resulted in an increase in '
information to the FBI regarding these individuals enrolled
at these universities.
III. TANGIBLE RESULTS OF COUNTERINTISLLIGSNCS
OPERATIONS
The interview program is effective based on
information received and has been a disruptive agc'nt in
BOP activities in the Memphis Division. The deliberate
planned iailurc to interview certain members of this
militant organization has also proved to be of value
inasmuch as information has been received indicating
that members of the BOP are suspicious of two of- their
own people as possibly being FBI informants based on
the fact that they have not been interviewed by the FBI.
The furnishing of selective information to the
Memphis police Department has resulted in the arrest of
several BOP members at Memphis, Tennessee. It has also
corroborated information received by the Memphis Police
Department Intelligence Unit through their own informants
and has enabled both the Memphis Police Department and the
Memphis FBI Office to more effectively control and check
on all sources of information in the racial field.
The most notable success in the counterintelligence
program in tiie Memphis Division has been as a result of
information furnished to trusted local newspaper sources.
A scries of articles has been written concerning the Black
Organizing Project (BOP) at Memphis, Tennessee. Based on
information furnished by the Memphis Office, these
articles have been able to point out the true militancy
of this organization and has proved to be a discrediting





IV. DEVELOPMENTS OF COUNTER INTELL IGB<CB
INTEREST
There has developed at Uemphis, Teonessee, ■ f •
during the past 90 days a new black militant organization
known as the Black Knights and investigation of this new
militant organization is being conducted by the Uemphis
Office. At the present time, these investigative efforts*
have resulted in the development of. a highly placed
informant on the Executive Board of this new black
power organization and will ultimately result in the
identity of all members of this organization at Uemphis,
Tennessee.
The primary black militant organization at
Uemphis remains the Black Organizing Project (BOP) which
is composed of 5 cells, which arc known as the Afro-
American Brotherhood (AAD), Black Student Association (BSA)
LcMoyne Intercollegiate Chapter of the NAACP, Invaders,
and City Organizers. This group, which has received
Federal funds under the War on Poverty Committee (WOPC),
sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO),
during this past summer at Uemphis, Tnncssce, has hopes
of continuing funding either by the Federal Government
and/or by private foundations. The newspaper publicity
afforded this Black Organizing Project (BOP), as a result
of information furnished to the local newspapers by the
FBI, has resulted in several of the black militants at
Uemphis, Tennessee, being fired from their positions
with this WOPC. It is hoped that enough information can
be furnished so that newspaper articles may be written
reflecting the militancy of this BOP which will result
in the discontinuance of their funding by the Federal
Government.
The Uemphis Office is remaining alert for any
opportunity to disrupt or discredit the black militant
organization known as BOP at Uemphis, Tennessee, and the
Bureau will be kept advised of all developments in this
matter.
J•w *tM. tm. m









SAC, LOS ANGELES (157-17^1) (P*)
O .
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
Re Los Angeles letter to Bureau, 6/3/89*
For Infomation concerning the counterintelligence
program directed against the Black Panther Party (BPP), the
Bureau's attention is directed to Los Angeles letters dated
6/3, 6/16, 6/26, 7/16, 7/25, 7/30 and 8/26/69. In accordance
with Bureau instructions, the counterintelligence operations
against the BPP are not being set forth in this letter.
• •
1 • Operations Under Consideration
The Los Angeles Office continually follows the
violations of the anti-riot and gun control laws by black
nationalists looking toward prosecution of these Individuals
tinder Federal and State statutes.
I A continuing survey of the telephone toll calls ofI various black nationalist leaders is being made under existing
\ Bureau policy to determine what counterintelligence programs
\ might be put Into effect.
2. Operations Being Effected
The Interview program within the black nationalist
y movement is being continued on a regular basis and this has
caused some concern and disruption among the members.
- Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - Los Angeles







The meinberehip of the **US** organization haa dropped
approximately 50 per cent« which is believed to be due in part
to the interview program.
1|.. Developments of Counterintelligence Interest
It has been noted that RON KARENGA, head of the "US”
organization, has moved his residence three times within the
past five months to avoid harassment by the police and possibly
to avoid a confrontation with the BPP. Consideration is being
given by the Los Angeles Office as to what benefit could be
derived through a counterintelligence program of making known
KAREIIGA's current address to the Police Department and possibly

















ReBuTelCall to me 3/12/68, and BuRad 3/21/68.
I have considered this matter, discussed It xlth
appropriate agent and supervisory personnel of the Mobile
Office and the following Is proposed as a counterintelligence
move on KING'S Washington Spring Project.
KING has quite a following In and around the Selma,
Ala. area and has
at the church of(^
KIliG's appearance
make derogatory reiuarks concerninf: KltjG was allegedly
miffed that KING did not advise him]
contemplated visit to Selma.
of his, KINO'S,
In view of the above, it Is felt that if some
method can be devised whereby can be advised of certain
items relative to the Washington"Spring Project, he would take
action to discourage Individuals from participating ther^n,
„ ... / ^
fl£G!Sr£fil;0 svoaa/-'' ' ——
yi'XXCfj'rv . i —mwmero etm ^ r —
I///
Special Agent in Charge
Sent .M Per
r,
.1., = •' ‘.‘If Is not believed that could be contactc
Iby a Bureau Agent, although he has on occasion furnlshe^ d
[^formation xhlch has proven.to be reliable, . . : . ' •'
• •• ■
. • - r ’- ; ••• •. • .V\
•• It Is, therefore ,■ proposed that ah anonvmouS' letter.*
directed to
1 wnerein it la cailea to the attention oltrj:irv;~?^
• ly* usIng the' Negroes of the Selma area lor
his own personal aggrandizement; that he Is not genuinely
Interested In their welfare, but only In their donations; that'
In all probability the Individuals going to Washington for..' • .i
■the Spring Project will be left stranded without suitable
housing or food. The letter should also play up the posslblll-’
ty of violenceparticularly the fact that although CARMICHAEL
and BROWN-of SNCC have a so-called.gentlemens' agreement with •
KING not to' take .'over this action^' there exists a strong ’* • '. '*
possibility that such will occur. ' There Is also the possibili¬
ty of RAM and NOI taking over the project since It lacks . ’ !•.
organization and direction. The letter should also point out
that KING was In Alabama on about 3/21/68, and did not make \
his schedule In the Selma and adjoining covintles area,. which'’V
was another Indication that XING was talking out of bo.th sides '
of his mouth; •. v.. .
; It Is felt that this letter should be mailed from .
either Washington .or Baltimore'since. If the’letter Is mailed ’
from anywhere In the south,may feel It is the work'of
the Klan or some other racist group. ''It Is felt that Baltimore
would probably be the best since a*letter from Washington-would
•.Indicate the possibility of ..the government doing this/* .; ^.
- •. * ‘ • • • . • *
■ Simultaneous with mailing the letter from'Baltimore,
It Is proposed that a copy of the ’letter to together ^
with a cover letter, be mn 1 Ifd'tf?
le^er should Indicate that attached was a letter directed t
and that he , j might want to . contact
rerati.ve • to receipt ofT.the letter and what it saiQ. •
• The thought behind this' Is to give a . ;
chance to Intervlewl^^^ concerning receipt of the letier ’ '
Id'thereby create a news story which could legitimately be^*r!~i
Published and read by the Negro community in fe Selma area,
It Is known that the. has a large clrcul
hlon among the Negro xToffuiiunity~Iin 'LiTlas and adjoining c6
[md has taken a rather liberal attitude -in connection with
LvJLl-rlghts movements,. : . . •'%. ' j •
« • o 0
“
By handling as above, w* would eliminate the
pesslblllty of these rumers bel^ attributed to the. FBIl i.:- -.
■
CoTtgjderation has been given to gome method of*---,
discouraging f for KING'a
pro.lect. and
a^ other portions of AiaDanxa. From pur contact
withwho Is a liaison source. It Is the opinion of
contact'iriii agents that he Is so* sold on the project'that it
Is almost impossible to disillusion him.
It Is also felt that some method of getting an
article In the "Southern Courier" along the lines of the above
would have a discouraging effect on the Negro community In
and around Montgomei*y, Ala., since the Courier Is very widely
read. Consideration Is being given to the method of accom¬
plishing this, .
The Bureau Is requested to consider the proposal
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SUBJECT:*—COINTELPRO - BLACK EXTREMISTS
- .RM -
1 The Bureau has been advised that the BPP is
presently negotiating for the manufacture of some 30/000
wrist watches to be produced in three models showing the
photo of HUEY P. NEWTON/ or BOBBY SEALE/ or ELDRIDGE CLEAVER .
on the fact of the watch and having the wording "Seize The/ '
Time" instead of numerals. The BPP is utilizing the project'
in anzattempt to raise cash and obviously plans on selling
'i ' these watches at sr price far above their cost of $5.50 each. . : ■• •• •
...In an attempt to discourage the sale of these : J>,i
watches at an inflated price and cut the Party's revenue/ '
San Francisco suggests the following letter be expeditiously
prepared at the Laboratory on BPP stationery and . • -
supposedly signed by HUEY NEWTON. It is requested that some
40 copies of the letter be printed and forwarded to the San
Francisco Division in order that they can be mailed to all
presently active BPP and NCCF chapters. San Francisco will ';









^ ^ ~The proposed letter is as
j4f
Approvad:
Special Agent in C.'iPl '* ' * S B. 1. OOVUUIM
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"To all Chapters of the Black Panther
Party and the National* Cononittee to
. Combat Fascism
■
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ance I have invented a new *:’V* ^j




*I wish to annou
wristwatch that will shortly be placed on the
market. .
"The watch will have a distinctive arm band V ' *
.
and will be made in three styles. One style will
feature on the face of the watch the photo of* v'.* .
, your Supreme Commander, another style will feature
a photo of brother Eldridge Cleaver and a third ‘
copy will feature on the face a photo of Bobby
Scale. These watches will be sold throughout the
country but they will first be made available to
all Black Panther Party members, community workers#
NCCF associates, and our friends at absolute cost.
The Huey P. Newton model will sell for $5.50, the
e offered to you
■
‘ .vV*
'• ' '"These watches will later be offered to the
general public at a much higher price. Tell your’<
friends to obtain our new Black Panther Party
watches through you at rock bottom prices. Please : 'V.:
advise National how many of your members and friends ;
desire to purchase such a watch and furnish us the V
particular model desired. . ; V.' ^.v
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